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CHAPTER I
In The Politics, Aristotle writes that "a state exists
for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only:
if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals might
form a state, but they cannot, for they have no share in hap-
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piness or in a life of free choice." Any governmental or-
ganization, from the largest nation to the smallest village,
can be conceived as designed not only to help man live, but
to help him live as he ought; a municipality, for example,
preserves life by its negative and protective functions, ex-
emplified in the fire, police, health and inspectional ser-
vices, simplifies life by its provision of such utilities
as water and roads, and finally improves life both by its
social functions, of which education and recreation are two
major examples, and also by the opportunities it provides
for man to develop co8perative ideals and common endeavors.
Although of vital importance, this aspect of the city's po-
tentialities is often forgotten in the smug satisfaction
with a high level of numerical and material achievement; if
the city provides hundreds of seats in school and hundreds of
miles of road and thousands of miles of pipes and millions
of gallons of water, its citizens pay their taxes without too
much grumbling and forget that the ideal city offers not only
(1) Aristotle: Politics, Book III, 1:6.
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service but opportunity - opportunity for its citizens to
improve both themselves and their environment.
Although both elements are indispensable, the realiza-
tion of this high ideal of government depends even more
upon a responsible and intelligent citizenry than upon
institutional organization; high achievement is possible
without elaborate governmental. mechanisms and intricate
administrative devices, while even the most refined and
perfected governmental organization is incapable of prod-
ding into competence a lazy and apathetic citizen body.
However, while government can be no better than the people
of whom it 'is composed, it can be infinitely worse, for ar-
chaic mechanisms can dull the efforts of even the most
vigilant and enlightened citizenry. "It is, of course, true
that the main questions of democracy are what may be termed
moral questions, depending far more upon the possession of
mind and character than upon any other factors. But mind
and character are everywhere useless without the full op-
portunity of application. It is here that the mechanisms of
modern democracy seem most inadequate."
The failure of most contemporary political units to
attain or approach the ideals and potentialities of govern-
ment cannot, of course, be ascribed to the inadequacy or
obsoleteness of the mechanisms which, as the creations of man
and society are forever subject to subsequent modification
(1) Laski: The Problem of Administrative Areas, p.16.
and improvement as the need arises. Unfortunately, this need
often aribes so slowly and subtly that the call for change is
unheeded and the opportunity for improvement passes neglected.
The governmental disorganization prevailing in this coun-
try's metropolitan districts furnishes a striking example of
the failure to modify governmental mechanism in response to
changed conditions. Rapid population growth and radical tech-
nological advances have combined to transform the pattern of
urban life, but despite the warning sounded by successive
Census enumerations, sociologists and citizens, the metropoli-
tan district has been permitted to improvise a governmental
organization on the basis of political units designed for
other times and other places. As a consequence of the fail-
ure to seize the early opportunities and institute promptly
the necessary minor -changes, the metropolitan district is to-
day confronted with a riotous disorganization of government
which only the boldest measures will correct. This paper at-
tempts to discover some reasons for the rapid course of the
metropolitan district's governmental disorganization and to
outline some of the serious administrative, operational,
social, political and fiscal problems it has created; it
tries to illustrate certain of these problems by a statisti-
cal study of the Boston region and, in conclusion, it suggests
guiding principles for the reorganization which might create
a metropolitan government that would help man not only to
live.but to live as he ought.
it
(1)
CHAPTER II
A city exists at three complementary levels of reality:
physically as an aggregation of buildings and utilities,
socially as a medium for the satisfaction of common interests
and the promotion of cooperative activities, and politically
as an instrument of control and of service. It is, of course,
obvious that the boundaries of the political, the social and
the physical city rarely if ever coincide and are in them-
selves often difficult to determine; for example, the boundary
of the "physical city" is constantly altered by new construc-
tion, while the area of the "political city", ordinarily
precisely defined by legal limits, is often enlarged by the
exercise of extraterritorial power. Even more elusive are
the boundaries of the "social city" which provides the insti-
tutional frame for the work and play of the urban area and
extends its influence in diminishing strength over a wide
area of semi-urban and even rural territory; indeed, the
examples of Paris and New York, with their world-wide power
in fashion and finance, suggest that the influence of the
"social city" can, in fact, pervade the entire world.
It is obvious that the boundaries of these three forms
of the city by no means cover the same territory; the
"political city" often includes undeveloped rural areas
11) This and the succeeding chapter borrow heavily from a
paper submitted by this writer in March 1947 to Prof.
Morris B. Lambie's Administrative Process Seminar, Graduate
School of Public Administration, Harvard University.
which-lack the buildings and the utilities that characterize
the "physical city"; on the other hand, the march of neat
rows of suburban cottages past the surveyor's lines carries
the "physical city" beyond ,its political limits, while the
"social city" reaches out still further to include a less
thickly settled border area lying beyond the urbanized ter-
ritory.
These inevitable variations in the extent of the politi-
cal, the physical and the social city are dangerous only when
they grow so great as to threaten the articulation which re-
lates the city's three forms and ensures its usefulness.
For the city is after all only a tool to strengthen the hand
of man in realizing the possibilities of his environment and
his nature, and the tool can be fully effective only when its
parts are efficiently related. When rapid population growth,
radical technological change and the multiplication of govern-
mental units create gross differences in the areas of the po-
litical, social and physical city, the tool loses its edge
and needs resharpening if it is to aid man in shaping his
Society and environment.
In the medieval-walled town, the ramparts were not only
the physical or geographical but also the social and political
boundaries of the city; within the walls were concentrated the
activities of trade, craft manufacture and labor that gave a
distinctive pattern to town life and called forth appropriate
governmental forms, while without the walls existed a sparsely
settled region which found its livelihood in agriculture and
its social and governmental focus in the manor and its vil-
lage. The gradual removal of the old city walls, as changed
conditions of life made their protection less necessary,
swept away the material boundaries of the city and symbolized
the growing interdependence between city and country that made
demarcation more difficult. Constant growth in functional
complexity and in size have so modified the modern city that
its physical area rarely coincides with its corporate limits
and its social and economic influence may trespass beyond both
its geographical and governmental bounds. Despite the incon-
gruity between its social, physical and governmental areas,
the city, however, possesses a sharpness of definition that
is lacking in metropolitan districts owing at least partially
to the absence of an appropriate metropblitan governmental
organization that would stimulate an awareness of the dis-
trict's essential unity. Yet because it is nebulous is no
justification for concluding, in the company of sorne writers,
that the metropolitan district does not exist; Lewis Mumford
is blinking the facts when he writes: "Physically incoherent,
socially disparate, the new metropolitan districts are at best
statistical collections. Here and there in the mass one may
partly trace the outline of a city: but the mass is -not a
city, in a functional sense, any more than the immediate
7
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countryside that surrounds it is a rural area." Admittedly,
these new areas are not cities, but neither are they mere
statistical collections; although they lack the sharp outlines
og the medieval-walled town or even the more blurred defini-
tion of the modern aitythe metropolitan district exists as
more than a name by virtue of the common interests and ac-
tivities of which it is the scene.
Common purpose, common pursuits, common interests are
the touchstones in determining the boundaries of both the
city and the metropolitan district; and since human activities
in their variety and complexity are the determinants, it
it should occasion no surprise to find that any finite boundary
is only an arbitrary approximation to the truth. It has
already been mentioned that the built-up area which is
essentially urban in character may not conform to the
corporate limits of a city; in the same way, the different
functions of the metropolitan district may not recognize
identical boundaries; accordingly, there is justification for
for speaking of the metropolitan retail area, the metropolitan
transit area or the metropolitan sewerage area, meanwhile
recognising the existence of the primary metropolitan district
as the- summation of a variety of different activities.
(1): Mumford, Lewis: The Culture of Cities, Harcourt Brace,
New York, 1938 - P.~2-34.
S
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Perhaps a metropolitan district can best be defined as
the territory throughout which the central city fixes the
pattern of life for the outlying areas. Admittedly this is
an unsatisfactory description since it involves so many
indeterminate terms of which "pattern of life" is only the
most complex; however, since the metropolitan district is a
social organization, the definition gains precision only at
the risk of becoming arbitrary. Although it has been forced
in the interests of statistical simplicity and comparability
to use a definition based on density, the Bureau of Census
has tacitly admitted that this technique can no more than
suggest the real extent of metropolitan districts; in
preparation for the 1930 census, the Bureau endeavored to
formulate a more trustworthy test by circularizing United
States' cities and requesting them to demarcate their
metropolitan area on the basis of the following factors:
"Commuting distance, including only suburbs from which not less
(1): The Census definition of a metropolitan district is in
part as follows: "A metropolitan district has been set
up for use in the 1940 Census of population in connection
with each city of 50,000 or more, two or more such
cities sometimes being in one district. The general
plan is to include in the district, in addition to the
central city or cities, all adjacent and contiguous
minor civil divisions or incorporated places having a
population of 150 or more per square mile .... " Bureau
of Census: 16th Census Of The United States, (1940)
Population, Vol. I, USGPo, Washington, 1942, P. 11.
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than 10 percent of the working population commute daily to
the central city; power and light territory served from
the central city; phone service area of the central city;
the territory served by the central city's water supply;
the area in which the daily newspapers of the central city
are delivered by the papers' own carriers; the area served
by house connections with the city's sewer system; the
residential membership area of social and athletic clubs
located within the central city; the area of operation of
local real estate companies in the surrounding region; the
area covered by the daily routes of solicitors, inspectors
and collectors, operating out of the central city as their
headquarters" It is indicative of the nature of the
metropolitan district that the attempt to determine its
boundaries should emphasize the extent of utility service;
until the Industrial Revolution metropolitan districts, and
even larger cities as they exist today, were unknown; in the
Ancient World only such capitols as Rome, Peiping and
possibly Nanking ever possessed over a million inhabitants,
while in modern times the number of cities of over 100,000
(1): Quoted McKenzie, R.D.: The Rise Of Metropolitan
Communities, Pp 453-4 from Civic Development Dept.,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Methods Of Procedure In
Defining Metropolitan Districts.
were few until the advent of steam power; toward the end of
the 17th Century, London, with a population estimated at
530,000, superseded Paris ,as the largest European city, but
it was not until 1811 that the area corresponding to that
of the present County of London reached a million inhabitants
and not until forty years later that Paris equalled this
2
figure. Since the development of large cities, and
especially of metropolitan districts, was the result of the
vast increases of production, wealth and population created
by the technological advances of the Industrial Revolution,
it is logical to emphasize the importance of te'chnological
criteria in delimiting metropolitan districts;- modern cities
cannot exist without electricity distribution networks,
water supplies, sewerage systems, and the degree to which
these facilities are provided by the- central city is an index
of its influence over the surrounding area, while the extent
of the local transit service, the rate zones set by postal
and telephone authorities and the carrier circulation areas
of downtown newspapers help outline the territory that can
be expected to have certain economic and social interests in
(1): Robson, W.A.: The Government And Misgovernment Of
London, Pp. 41 & 45.
(2): Paris (1851) 1,053,262 (Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol.
17, P. 241)
1 1
common. Numerous other criteria for determining, the extent
of metropolitan districts can be suggested; among the more
plausible of those not mentioned in the quotation cited
above are the central city's retail and wholesale trade
areas, the audience distribution of central city radio
stations, the local freight rate zone, the degree of use by
outlying territory of central city institutions, such as
hospitals, schools and banks and the location of the areas
where central city residents seek outdoor recreation. It
is obvious then from the variety and. complexity of the
criteria which must be considered that the lines on the map
can at best only suggest the outlines of an area in which
urbanization and an interdependent pattern of life have
created what is called a metropolitan district.
1 6-
TABLE 1
URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1940
Total Pop.
Year (add 000)
1790
1840
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
3,929
17,069
62,948
75,995
91,972
105,711
122,775
131,669
% of Total
Urban Rural
5.1~
10.8
3501
3907
4507
51.2
56.2
56.5
94.9
89.2
6409
60.3
5403
48.8
43.8
43.5
% Increase
Total Urban
335
348
2007
21.0
1409
16.1
7.2
814
1098
3604
3903
29.0
2703
7.9
Urban Increase
As % of Total
12*5
4402
6106
74.2
8803
86.7
61.6
Source: 16th Census, Population, Vol. I, Table 6
CHAPTER III
In the one hundred and fifty years 1790-1940 the United
States has been transformed from a nation 94% of whose
population lived in rural areas to one in which 57% were
inhabitants of urban territory; while in 1940 there were
about 15 times as many people living in rural regions as in
1790, there were also over 320 times as many urban residents.
(Table 1) In 1790 the United States contained only 33
incorporated places having a population of 2,500 or more,
1
and it was not until 1820 that New York became the first
city in the nation to exceed the 100,000 mark; by 1930, the
number of urban places had grown to 3,165 and the 93 cities
with a population of 100,000 or more contained 30% of the
country's total. In the next' decade, 1930-1940, although
the number of urban places increased to 3,464, the rate of
increase of the urban population slackened markedly and
approximately one third of the cities of over 100,000
suffered An absolute loss, indicating the imminence of the
stablization of the urban population, which had been intimated
by earlier statistical trends. (Table 2).
(1): The area now covered by New York's five boroughs had
a population of 1,119,734 in 1810, but no single
borough had over 100,000 population until Manhattan
reached. the figure of 1.123,706 in the Census of 1820.
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TABLE 2
GROWTH OF URBAN PLACES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1940
Number of'
Urban Places
24
131
1,348
1,737
2,262
2,722
3,165
3,464
Number of Cities
100,000 and over
0
3
28
38
50
68
93
92
% of Total Pop. in
Cities 100,000 andover
0.0
3.0
15.4
18.8
22.1
26.0
2906
28 .8
Source: 16th Census, Population, Vol. I, Table 10
Year
1790
1840
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
Within the- past fifty years, the growth in the urban
population and the increase in the number of urban places
have been largely a. reflection of the phenomenal growth of
metropolitan districts. Although the existence of such
areas had been recognized by the Bureau Of Census in its
Report On Social Statistics Of Cities, published in 1886,
and also in a special bulletin, Industrial Districts, which
was issued in 1905, it was not until the Thirteenth Census
of 1910 that significant population statistics were collected
and analysed for metropolitan districts. Selecting cities
of 200,000 or more population as nuclei, the Census published
figures both for total population of civil divisions entirely
or predominantly within a ten mile distance from the central
city's boundaries and for the population within that
territory living in areas that could be considered urban in
character by virtue of a population density of 150 or more
persons per square mile; figures also were 'ublished covering
the population of all cities of 100,000 or over and of
adjacent territory within a ten mile zone from the limits
of these cities. The 25 metropolitan districts, comprising
the central city or cities of 200,000 inhabitants or over
and the adjacent territory of an urban character within the
ten mile zone, were found to include 24% of the nation's
total population, while the metropolitan cities of 100,000
TABLE 3
(1)
POPULATION OF METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS 1910-1920
(2)
1900
Number of Districts
Area in Square Miles
Total Population (add 000)
% U.S. Total Population
in Central City
% Outside Central City
Source:
16,323
21.5
7806
21.4
(3)
1910
25
737101
22,088
24.0
77.4
22.6
(4)
1920
29
10,650.2
29,239
27.7
75*5
24.5
(1) For 1910-1920 definition of metropolitan
districts, see text
(2) 1900 data for area included within 25 districts
as delimited by 1910 census from 13th Census,
(1910) Vol. I, Table 50
(3) 13th Census (1910) Vol. I, Table 50
(4) 14th Census (1920) Vol. I, Table 40
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inhabitants or over and all adjacent territory within the
ten mile distance from their limits contained about 29% of
the-total; the next census revealed the addition of 4 new
districts to the 25 outlined by the 1910 census and indicated
that these 29 districts contained 28% of the country's total
population. (Tables 3 and 4).
Although, as has already been mentioned, the Fifteenth
Census of 1930 attempted to replace the arbitrary criterion
of density as the basis for the definition of metropolitan
districts, the necessity for comparability in the data
forced a return to density as the one factor which could be
determined easily and consistently for each of various areas;
the definition used in 1910 and 1920 was, however, modified
in the interests of giving weight to the population of the
entire area as well as that of the central city; metropolitan
status was made dependent upon the existence of a population
of 50,000 or more in the central city (replacing the previous
standard of 200,000 or more) and of 100,000 or more in the
combined central city and contiguous territory where density
exceeded 150 persons per square mile; such "urbanized
territory" was no longer confined to a zone within ten miles
of the central city's boundaries, but was extended as far as
the density and contiguity requirements could be satisfied..
This new definition of metropolitan districts made it
TABLE 4
POPULATION OF METROPOLITAN CITIES AND ADJACENT TERRITORY
(1)
1910-1920
Number of Areas
Area in Square Miles
Total Population (add 000)
% U.S. Total Population
In Central City
Outside Central City
(2)
1900
20, 190
26*6
7206
2704
(3)
1910
44
28,582.9
27,021
29.4
72.4
27.6
1920
58
36,667.5
36,887
34.9
71.2
28.8
(1) The tabulation includes all cities with 100,000
or more population and their adjacent civil
divisions all or more than half of which, in
population or area, lie within 10 miles of the
city's boundary
(2) 1900 data for area included within the 44 areas
as delimited by 13th census from 13th Census
(1910) Vol.I, Table 52
(3) 13th Census (1910) Vol. I, Table 52
(4) 14th Census (1920) Vol. I, Table 42
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Source:
unnecessary to report separately the figures, which had
been given in 1910 and 1920, for the population of metro-
politan cities, that is those having 100,000 or more
inhabitants, and of adjacent territory within 10 miles of
the city boundaries.
Although they covered only 1.2% of its land area, the
96 metropolitan districts designated in 1930 on the basis of
the revised definition contained 45% of the total population
of the United States, while the 140 districts delimited by
the 1940 Census included 48% of the country's population, and
the 17 largest metropolitan districts, each with 750,000 or
more residents, concentrated within their boundaries about
one third of the nation's people. (Table 5). It is
significant that though the percentage population increase
in metropolitan districts exceeded comparable figures for
both the whole country and for urban places and while these,
districts absorbed over 60% of the country's total population
increases in the two decades 1920-1930, 1930-1940, (Table 6),
the percentage of the districts' population living in the
central cities was steadily declining, reaching a low figure
of 68% in the most recent Census.
Although the decreasing rate of growth indicates the
unliktlihood of further general and rapid expansion, figures
recently released by the Bureau of Census show that several
20
TABLE 5
(1)
POPULATION OF METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS 1930-1940
Number of Districts
Area in Square Miles
Total Population (add 000)
% U. S Total Population
% In Central City
% Outside Central City
(2)
1920
42,670
40.4
7204
27.6
(3)
1930
96
36,577.9
54,754
44.6
69.2
3008
1940
140
44,626.0
62,966
47.8
68.0
32.0
Source: (1) For 1930-1940 definition of Metropolitan
Districts, see text
(2) 1920 data for area included within 96.districts
as delimited by 1930 Census from U. S National
Resources Cmmittee: Population Statistics,
Vol. 3, Urban Data, USGPO, Washington, 1937,
Table 31
(3) 15th Census (1930) Population V 1. II, Table 11
(4) 16th Census (1940) Population, fol. I, Table 17
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of the country's metropolitan districts registered sub-
stantial gains during the war years; thus, on the basis of
sample counts it is estimated that the population of the
Los Angeles metropolitan district had grown to 3,917,000 by
April of this year, an increase of 35% over the figure
enumerated in 1940; similiar sample counts indicate a 5%
increase in the population of the Pittsburg metropolitan
district and a 13% growth in the Rochester metropolitan
1
area. Even though these gains may represent only a wartime
phenomenon, the tremendous increases that the fifty years
1890-1940 have brought to their population assure the
metropolitan districts of a preponderant position in our
national life: it is clear that this country has become not
only urbanized but metropolitanized as well.
(1) U.S. Bureau of Census: Current Population Reports:
Population Characteristics, Series P 21: Los Angeles
#30, Pittsburg #8, Rochester #27. 1947.
TABLE 6
POPULATION INCREASE IN THE UNITED STATES - 1890-1940
1930-40 1930-20 1920-10 1910-00 1890-1900
(1)
Percentage Increase
Total Population 7.2 16.1 14.9 21.0 20.7
Urban Population 7.9 27.3 29.0 39.3 36.4
Metropolitan Dist.
Population 9.3 28.3 26.9 35.2 - -
Met. Dist. Increase 60.4 70.7 45.0 36.1 - -
As % of Total U.S.
Increase
(1): Population increase for metropolitan districts is the
interdecennial population increase in the areas classi-
fied at the second census as falling within metropoli-
tan districts:- i.e. increase in population of metropoli-
tan districts-for 1930-1940 is the difference between the
population of the 140 districts as delimited by the 1940
Census and the 1930 population of the same area.
Source: Appropriate om sus tables listed as sources for
Tables 3 and 5.
CHAPTER IV
Although the rapid growth and movement of population in
the last fifty or one hundred years have radically altered
this countryts pattern of population distribution, there has
been no corresponding transformation of the political units
by which the country is governed; and though it has created
problems both in rural areas and in smaller cities, this
dislocation and maladjustment of political units and of
population is most acute in the metropolitan districts.
The failure of political units to adapt themselves to
the new needs created by the growth and redistribution of
population is simply another example of the inability or at
best the reluctance of institutions to modify their structure
in response to new social realities; the problem of political
units within the metropolitan district is thus but a new
manifestation of the ageless problem of the social lag.
Although the hopeless inadequacy of the existing multi-
tude of units to provide the metropolitan district with
satisfactory government has become acute in this country only
since the turn of the century, similar perplexities were
not unknown at an earlier date; prior to the consolidation
of 1854 government in the Philadelphia area was divided among
the central city, with an 1850 population of 121,376, and
5 suburban towns, with a total of over 220,000 residents.
As long ago as the 16th Century, London became conscious- of
the metropolitan problem which it attempted to solve, not
by any improvement of political units, but by a restriction
on new building in the hope of preventing further population
growth. Similar efforts in succeeding generations were, of
course, powerless to check the growth of London or to prevent
the steady deterioration of the articulation between the
political, social and physical aspects of the metropolis;
within the London Metropolitan Police District, a greater
London area of 693 square miles containing a prewar population
of 8,655,000 (1937), there are, in addition to countless
special districts, 6 parish councils, 4 rural districts, 30
urban districts, 35 municipal boroughs, 3 county boroughs,
28 metropolitan boroughs, the City of London and all or
2
parts of 5 counties; within the area of the Greater London
Plan, which excludes the administrative County and the City
of London, there are 143 local municipal corporations in
addition to the usual large number of statutory authorities
3
or special districts.
(1) See Abercrombie: Greater London Plan, P. 29 ff.
(2) Robson: The Government And Misgovernment Of London,
P. 371. -
(3) Abercrombie: op.cit. P. 1.
In this country efforts, both negative and positive, to
simplify and rationalize the governmental structure of our
140 metropolitan districts have met~with but little more
success than the early English measure previously mentioned.
As a consequence, the metropolitan districts, which contain
almost 48% of the country's total population, lack any
appropriate governmental organization; - they simply do not
have any government or rather they are cursed with such a
superfluity of overlapping and redundant jurisdictions that
the pattern of organization is totally obscured and
operational efficiency is virtually impossible.
For the purposes of a 1942 enumeration of governmental
units in the United States, the Bureau of the Census dis-
tinguished 7 types of units including: CL) U.S. government,
(2) states, (3) counties, (4) townships and towns, (5) muni-
cipalities, (6) school districts, and (7) special districts;
in general,. the Bureau considered all governmental agencies
as governmental units if "tthey are geographic subdivisions
or population concentrations that maintain a distinct legal
existence, are public corporations or at least quasi
corporations, and are politically organized for the conduct
1
of local affairs."
(1) Bureau Of Census: Governmental Units In The United
States 1942, 1944, P. 3.
TABLE 7
GOVERNMENTAL UNITS WITHIN
THE 17 LARGEST METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS
No. of Incorporated
Places, Counties and
Municipalities onl i
Other than Central City U
1940 1930 1920
N.Y.-Northeastern N.J.
Chic ago
Los; Angeles
Philadelphia
Boston
Detroit
Pittsburg
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose
St. Louis
Cleveland
Baltimore
Providence-Fall River-
New Bedford
Minneapolis-St. Paul
Washington, D.C.
Buffalo-Niagara
Cincinnati
Milwaukee
284
117
55
92
54
44
136
44
69
45
264
114
54
91
54
42
134
41
47
40
212
95
44
72
52
24
135
35
36
30
4 4 4
21 21
34 33
31 25
13 13
46 44
13 11
1,103 1,032
19
30
16
12
39
10
863
All Govern-
mental Units(2)
1942
1,039
821
353
522
96
458
613
414
539
60
15
42
419
63
375
192
200
6,221
Source: (1) Jones, Metropolitan Government, Table 5,
(2) U.S. Bureau of Census. Governmental Units in the
United States 1942-1944. Table 11
Total
Using these criteria and classifications, the Bureau
found that in 1942 the country's 140 metropolitan districts
contained 15,827 governmental units distributed as follows:
Counties . . . . . . . . . . 272
Townships . . . . . . . . . . 895
Municipalities- ... . . .1,9741
School Districts . . . . . 11,822
Special Districts . . . . . 1,097
Total 15,827
These figures indicate that in the average metropolitan
district governmental responsibility is divided among approx-
imately 115'political units, in addition to the state and
federal governments which overlap the district but are not
included in the tabulation. Some districts, of course,
possess many more units than the mathematical average; thus
in the metropolitan district centering about New York City
and covering portions of Connecticut, New Jersey and New
York, the total of 1,039 governmental units includes 286
municipalities, 520 school districts and 141 special districts.
The government of the Chicago metropolitan area is divided
among 5 counties, 14 townships, 115 municipalities, 593
school districts and 66 special districts; within the portions
of Pennsylvania and New Jersey covered by the Philadelphia
(1) Ibid. Table 11. All figures given in this paragraph are
derived. from this table.
metropolitan district, there are 522 units, while in the
Los Angeles area there are 353. (Table 7). However, it
is not only in the larger districts that governmental
responsibility is divided among a large number of different
jurisdictions;the smaller metropolitan districts repeat the
same pattern and sometimes show in proportion to their area
and population a greater relative number of units than the
larger districts; the Kalamazoo district includes 118 units
of government, the Madison district 286, and the Altoona
district 134; within the Sioux City district there are 179
units, while the Rochester and Syracuse districts contain
respectively 194 and 212 separate units of government.
It is obvious from the figures classifying the total
number of governmental units in the country's 140 metropolitan
districts that the counties and the incorporated places
constitute a relatively small percentage of the total; it is
in fact the two remaining classifications - the school
district and the special district, that comprise over 81% of
the total number of units found within the metropolitan
districts.
The special district is a hybrid political unit usually
created to perform one of a variety of specific functions;
thus a district may be organized for the construction of
highways, control of weeds, conservation of soil, irrigation
2')
of land, production of electricity, operation of libraries
or any of a number of other purposes of which by far the
most common is the provision of free education. In 1942
approximately 80% of the Chicago metropolitan district's 821
governmental units were special districts (including the
subdivision of school districts); in the New York area during
the same year counties, townships and municipalities
comprised 36.4% and special and school districts 63.8% of the
total of 1,039 units, while in the Pittsburg district the
respective figures werb 36.7% and 63.3%. In the Detroit
metropolitan area the 383 school and special districts
constituted 83.5% of the total number of units, and in a
smaller center such as the Decatur district, the corresponding
figure reaches almost 98%. An earlier tabulation of the
political units in the Chicago region is revealing for its
detailed information on the type of districts adding to the
governmental confusion of the area; in 1933 the metropolitan
region, defined as the territory lying within a fifty mile
radius of the Loop, contained 204 cities and villages, 15
counties, 165 townships, 978 school districts, 70 park
districts, 4 forest preserve districts, 11 sanitary districts,
190 drainage districts, 4 mosquito abatement districts and
(1) Ibid: Table 11.
1 health district or a total of 1,642 governmental units.
Cook County contained 419 units, including 195 school
districts, 56 park districts, 1 forest preserve district, 4
sanitary districts, 40 drainage districts, 2 mosquito
districts and l health district, while even in the city of
Chicago itself responsibility was divided among 27 units of
1
local government. As in all metropolitan districts, the
size and importance of the special districts in the Chicago
region varies widely; at one extreme is the Chicago Sanitary
District with its huge payroll and its 442 square mile area,
while at the other are some of the insignificant school and
park districts; similar major authorities and districts in
other parts of the country, for example the Port of New York
Authority or the East Bay Municipal Utility District in the
San Francisco region, exercise such important funtions and
control such large budgets that they overshadow the
activities of most of the municipalities lying within their
operational territory.
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(1) Merriam, Parratt and Lepawsky: The Government Of The
Metropolitan Region Of Chicago, p. 9.
CHAPTER V
"Every integrated urban community having a population
of over 35,000-50,000 should be organized as one local
('metropolitan') government. Wherever possible it should
be a single administrative unit for all local services and
have one governing body (rather than split into several
layers such as county, city, school and special districts -
each with separate governing bodies.)" This ideal is so
completely at variance with the realities of government within
the metropolitan district that it is necessary to seek some
explanation for the multiplication of independent juris-
dictions which has completely frustrated governmental unity;
since it is after all not a novel idea that a socially and
economically unified urban area can be best administered by
a unified government it is natural to look to the past and
present for some account of what obscured the ideal.
*2
In the early decades of this country's independence local
governmental units were organized to meet the needs of the
(1) Hansen and Perloff: State And Local Finance In The
National Economy, P. 91.
3?
many small population clusters that developed in the relative
isolation created by inadequate transportation facilities
and the surrounding expanses of rural and forest land; thus,
in New England, where civil and religious governments were
virtually consolidated in the hands of a theocracy, new
towns and churches were created to serve the convenience of
growing population centers isolated or distant from the
older churches. "From 1630 to 1830 in all parts of the
(Boston) metropolitan area, the commonest cause assigned in
the petitions for the establishment of a new town, was the
remoteness from existing places of worship. Where remote-
ness was clearly shown there was frequently-no opposition
on the part of the existing church and town to separation,
if only a new church was established and a legal minister
1
supported." In the southern colonies, incorporated places
were at first unable to rival the importance of the county
system of government, but towards the end of the 18th
Century were gradually established in increasing numbers to
2
meet the commercial needs of the region. In later years,
religious and commercial motives for the establishment of
incorporated places were superseded by newer incentives that
(1) McCaffrey: The Political Disintegration And Reintegration
Of Metr0olitan Boston, P. 2.
(2) Carpenter: Problems In Service Levels, P. 13 ff.
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reflected the changing basis of the national economy; thus
the separation of Somerville and. Charleston in 1842
represented a governmental recognition of the radically
different needs of rural and of urbanized areas, while the
1851 divorce of West Roxbury from its parent town of Roxbury
arose from the unwillingness of the former's residents to
contribute to the support of the older area's rapidly in-
1
creasing pauper population.
As natural increase and. immigration during the last
hundred years added to the population of our principal cities,
the metropolitan districts grew in size and absorbed within
their boundaries the previously established governmental
units that had formerly led-an independent existence beyond
their peripheries; rural towns established in response to
some of the motives suggest above were thus swallowed up by
the metropolitan district as the increasing population
radiated from the center of concentration. At the same time
that older governmental units were added to the number of
those sharing the control of the expanding metropolitan
districts, new units were created to supply the needed
service and control in unincorporated rural areas into which
population began to spill.
(1) McCaffrey: op. cit. P. 7 ff.
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Within the last 50 years the multiplication of new
municipal corporations within its area has considerably
complicated the pattern of governmental organization in the
metropolitan district. Many new incorporation doubtless
represented the logical response to a need for service which
existing governmental units were unable to supply; at the
same time, it is apparent that villages, towns and. other
political units were sometimes the children of less respect-
able motives; in New Jersey, for instance, two boroughs,
cqvering little more than the areas of two golf courses,
were created for the obvious purpose of avoiding contributions
toward local school support and possible interference with
Sunday sport; and while instances are rare of such complete
perversion of government's purpose, many incorporations are
designed in a more subtle fashion to serve rather the interests
of the few than the welfare of the many; thus wealthy suburb-
anites often seek to insulate their community with political
boundaries against the problems of the older portions of the
district, and, in other instances, small groups of landowners
and real estate operators may find the path to larger profit
smoothed by the creation of new governmental units.
As a consequence of the numerous motives, questionable
and valid, for the creation of new units, the number of
(1) Carpenter: op.cit. P. 85.
municipalities within the metropolitan districts has in-
creased at a perceptibly faster rate than throughout the
country as a whole; a study made during the 30's discovered
that while the number of incorporated places in the entire
country had grown 106% during the period 1890-1930, the
number lying within the area covered by the 90 metropolitan
districts defined by the 1930' Census had increased 159%,
from a figure of 605 in 1890 to 1,566 in 1930.
Multiplying within the metropolitan districts at a
greater rate than throughout the country as a whole, the
districts' increasing number of governmental units have so
overcrowded a limited territory that efficient administrative
areas disappear; and like young trees too closely sown, the
numerous municipalities grow up as puny and inefficient
political units that fail to provide the district with satis-
factory government.
To overcome the inefficiency arising from ineffectual
and unrelated efforts by countless weak and small boroughs,
villages, towns and even cities, there arises a need for
additional governmental units of a different type:
consequently special districts are introduced to discharge
functions that the municipalities are too weak and small to
(1) Lepawsky: Development Of Urban Government, Table 15,
P. 27.
assume. Thus a sewerage district is created to secure
functional coordination in a watershed whose area is parcelled
out among countless cities, or a library district is
organized to enable several small municipal units to maintain
a service that none singly could afford. The rapid
multiplication of municipalities with insufficient resources
and inefficient areas thus reaches its climax in a govern-
mental decrepitude for which one palliative is the organiza-
tion of still more units of another type.
3
Since the period of rapid urban growth first began to
aggravate the problem, there have been repeated attempts to
simplify and improve the structure of government in the metro-
politan district; annexation, consolidation and various other
types of reorganization have, in fact, succeeded in rare cases
in reducing the number of units operating within certain of
our metropolitan districts; yet, in view of the seriousness
of the problems which it poses, attempts to remedy the
governmental disorganization of the metropolitan district
have been surprisingly rare and dishearteningly unsuccessful,
Owing chiefly to the inertia of the many and .the selfishness
of the few. The great majority of the districtb voters are
simply not sufficiently aroused by its governmental problems
to make the small effort needed to defeat the vociferous
opposition which self-interest inspires in the few. This is
rot to suggest that all opponents of proposed. plans for
metropolitan reorganization are mistaken and misinformed;
many schemes are improperly conceived. and deserve the censure
of even the staunchest advocates of governmental rational-
ization, while many admirable plans find opponents whose
sincerity earns respect if not support for their views; such
honest criticism is, however, infinitesimal in comparison
with the opposition springing from avowed or tacit self-
interest and greed.
The active opposition of the suburbs to any schemes for
consolidation arises from such a variety of motives as the
desire to preserve a fashionable address, the reluctance to
assume the tax and debt burden of poorer municipalities and
the exaggerated repugnance for the political administration
of the central city. The successful efforts of Brookline,
Evanston and Pasadena in resisting annexation by their central
city merely exemplify the reluctance of wealthy suburbs
throughout the country to place their tax base at the disposal
of poorer areas; on rarer occasions, as illustrated by
Bostonts coolness to sporadic annexation bids .by Revere and
Chelsea, even the central city may be deterred by these
economic motives from extending its boundaries. Where the
city or town has a long history and established traditions,
oppostion based on economic motives is supplemented by a
natural disinclination to countenance the submerging of
local individuality that would result from a consolidation
with a larger city.
The suburbs, however, usually find it inexpedient to-
advertise the opposition based on an anticipated financial
loss and instead prefer to stress the virtue and vitality of
their sturdy grass-roots democracy, which they contrast so
favorably with the corrupt and machine-ridden administration
of the central city. Without in the least belittling the
admirable civic spirit existing in some suburbs and while
not denying the imperfections which mar much central city
administration, it is worth noting the vigorous suburban
self-government has often a livelier existence in oratory
than fact; the local government of a suburb may for years be
moribund and ineffective only to receive a sudden and
deceptive bloom of life from the outraged and self-righteous
protests of the suburban opponents of annexation or
consolidation. The special districts and authorities often
rely on a similar line of argument and proclaim the necessity
of keeping housing or education free from the taint of
politics; perhaps they fail to see that a simpler and more
effective solution would be simply to give politics an airing
that would remove the taint. This is only to say that the
devil can quote the scriptures and to imply that for each
disinterested opponent of governmental simplification there
are a considerable number who mask the real reasons for
their opposition behind plausible but irrelevant arguments.
"The mischief which arises from local sentiment in our day
is largely attributable to human greed. Community welfare
is too often narrowly defined in terms of the selfish interests
of local groups and units of local government are too often
1.
made to serve the exigencies of partisan politics."
The politicians share with their constituents a tendency
to conceal self-interest behind an elaboration of arresting
but confusing argument; and when jobs, patronage and a care-
fully constructed political organization are threatened by
proposals to consolidate certain of the metropolitan
district's governmental units, the politician is even more
expert thath the citizen in discovering arguments which are
arresting and plausible but logically inconclusive. A state-
ment issued with the approval.of the Republican and. Democratic
county committees by four circuit court judges during the
1930 campaign to merge the city of St. Louis with the separate
county of the same name pulls all the stops at the command
(1) Carpenter: op.cit. P. 37.
of the average politician in his efforts to block reorgan-
ization; the judges found that the proposed merger was a
"dangerous experiment in municipal government" that will
inevitably create "distressing litigation and unsettled
business conditions"; they further solemnly concluded that
it creates a crisis "because it confers power to deprive
our people of the last vestige of local self-government" and
because it fails adequately to protect the minority, that
is the county residents, but most important of all because
it sets up a "super-government" and places in the fundamental
1
law of the state "a wholly unworkable scheme."
The semantic irresponsibility of such statements could
be easily exposed and the active opposition offered by the
interested few could be easily defeated if the mass of the
voters developed any concern over the improvement of govern-
ment within the metropolitan districts. Their continuing
inertia, however, constitutes a more serious obstacle to the
success of any reorganization proposals than the noisy but
uncompelling arguments advanced by the minority. The average
voter's interest in the business of local government does
not ordinarily extend far beyond the amount of his property
(1) Faust; "Missouri Voters Reject Metropolitan Amendment,"
NMR 20: 14, Jan. 1931.
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tax and lacks the strength to scrutinize the defects of
existing governmental organization and to evaluate the
benefits that might accrue from its modification; for such
people, a good and sufficient justification for the continued
existence of any governmental unit is simply the fact that
it now exists, has existed in the past and is thus hallowed
by tradition.
Inertia, however, not only dulls an appreciation of the
serious problems arising from a superfluity of political
units, but also preserves outdated constitutions and obsolete
statutes and thus thwarts the legal changes that would
facilitate governmental reorganization. After a careful
study in 1930 of Chicago's most pressing problems, the
Citizens' Advisory Committee agreed on a number of detailed
recommendations all of which required prior statutory or
constitutional amendment to permit execution; and three years
later the Chicago Recovery Administration found. that effective
financial reforms for the city were thwarted by obsolete
sections in the statutes . In many instances, the state
legislature actually encourages further governmental confu-
sion by imposing on municipalities rigid tax or debt limita-
tions which so cripple their ability to provide service that
U) Lepawsky: Home Rule For Metropolitan Chicago, P. 89.
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special districts and authorities must be created. as a means
of escape. Owing to pyramided governments, Chicagots
effective 1942 debt limit was 21% of the assessed valuation
2
of the city's real property; any attempt to simplify the
governmental structure would face the formidable obstacle
that under existing enactments consolidation would reduce
this limit to the city's figure of 5%. Similar restrictions
embodied in the laws of other states are a major reason for
the multiplication of special districts, which, owing to
their legal status are able effectively to increase the city's
borrowing power without adding to its legally limited debt.
Any scheme of governmental simplification within metro-
politan districts involves many difficult problems of which
the most central is that of reconciling 'efficient operational
areas with a governmental unit retaining responsiveness to
the will of its constituents. This and similar important
issues can, however, be solved; yet their solution will be
fruitless unless the inertia, indifference and selfishness
which have hitherto been instrumental in defeating proposals
for governmental simplification can be replaced by an enlightened
community of self-interest to which the advantages of a reduction
(1) See Davis: "Borrowing Machines", NMR 24: 328-34, June 1935.
(2) Council Of State Governments: State Local Relations,
P. 222.
and rationalization of the number of governmental units will
readily recommend itself. Writing of the Chicago area Charles
Merriam and his colleagues summarized the situation in these
rather tart words: "The community may prefer, however, to
pay a considerable price for the maintenance of these separate
political institutions in their isolation, and if they chose
this independence of sixteen hundred governments in preference
to broader or better public services or the present services
at lower cost, it is, after all, the privilege of the
community so to order its affairs. If the people of Chicago
and vicinity admire, enjoy and are willing to pay the cost
of this proliferation of government, that is their
prerogative."
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(1) Merriam, Parratt and Lepawsky: The Government Of The
Metropolitan Region Of Chicago, P. 127.
CHAPTER VI
Although the different sections of any metropolitan
district are, of course, distinguished by important variations
in topography, density, land use and a host of other matters,
they are nonetheless bound together, not only by networks of
roads and utilities, but even more significantly, by common
interests, purposes and activities. However, though it is in
many important respects an economic and social unit, the
metropolitan district lacks a correspondingly unified govern-
ment to provide service, control and, in general, a framework
for the activities of the area; the New York region, for
instance, has not 1 but 1,039 governments, and even the
Boston region, which represents a relative model of restraint,
contains 96 independent governmental units.
In the preceding section an attempt has been made to
suggest some of the reasons for the initial organization
and the continuing existence of the multitude of units that
today divide the government of this country's 140 metropolitan
districts; in this chapter an effort will be made to discuss
some of the serious difficulties plaguing municipal planning,
administration and operations as a result of the failure of
the metropolitan district to develop a governmental organization
adapted to its social and economic unity; the two succeeding
chapters will consider the equally serious problems which
arise from the same fundamental cause in the fiscal and the
socio-political fields.
2
The numerous governmental units, large and small, of
the typical metropolitan district can neither plan wisely
nor operate efficiently owing to the limited areas, small
populations, and restricted powers that sap their self-
sufficiency; for although they may possess exclusive
authority over their limited jurisdictional areas, both the
small suburb of a few hundred or thousand inhabitants and the
large city, which may perhaps contain over three quarters of
the metropolitan district's total population, are too contin-
uously and intimately affected by what transpires beyond
their borders to be able to guarantee satisfactory planning
and operation even within their own limits. The special
district does not escape this defect, but only experiences
it in a different form; for 'while the district often includes
suffilcient territory to form an efficient planning and oper-
ational area, and in fact sometimes covers the entire metro-
politan district, it possesses authority in only one or at
best several functional fields and is thus constantly hampered
4f
by the independent and unrelated activities of other units
in the correlated fields over which it has no control; a
transit district, for instance, cannot make realistic plans
for route extensions when frequent and. sometimes capricious
changes in municipal zoning ordinances threaten to alter
the pattern of population distribution, nor can a fire
district prepare effective plans in the absence of any
control over the supply of water and the laying of mains.
The individual municipalities are, of course, equally at the
mercy of the independent and uncoordinated activities of
both neighboring communities and the special districts, and,
as a consequence, their ability to plan effectively is
sharply curtailed if not extinguished. Early in the growth
of the metropolitan districts the inability of the countless
municipalities to provide by individual effort a satisfactory
overall plan for the provision and. operation of certain
important services led to the creation of such special bodies
as the Boston Metropolitan Water District (1895) and the
Chicago Sanitary District (1889); since that time the growing
complexity of urban and. metropolitan life has constantly
increased the number of functions for which the individual
municipalities alone are powerless to plan until today water
and sewer systems, ports, airfields, recreation areas, transit
lines and arterial roads are among the facilities whose
47
planning is commonly delegated to special area-wide authori-
ties. However, even in the planning of services which
superficial consideration would classify as purely local in
their scope, the municipalities cannot escape the influence
of their neighborst actions: industrial development beyond
the city limits may create population increases that over-
tax the municipal school system and unanticipated road im-
provements in a neighboring suburb may place a formerly
quiet playground on what develops into a major traffic artery.
3
In many metropolitan districts the municipalities,
having experienced the futility of plans conceived in
isolation, have attempted. to provide certain important
services by joint effort; the history of a few of these
experiments creates little confidence in the ability of this
method to solve one of the metropolitan district's funda-
mental problems. Often the joint effort never advances
beyond the preliminary paper work owing to the disagreements
developing among the municipalities involved; thus in the
Boston area, where the pollution of the Charles, Neponset
and Mystic Rivers had long created a menace to health, the
metropolitan sewerage system which the City of Boston pro-
posed in 1875 failed to secure the support of the other cities
and towns concerned, and, as a result, Boston had to content
itself with the construction of the Main Drainage system
1
which lies almost entirely within city limits. The joint
effort of New York and New Jersey did ultimately culminate in
the 1927 opening of the Holland Tunnel, but only after dis-
cussion, confusion and recrimination originating in 1906 and
2
extending over a 21-year period. In front of the doors of
M.I.T. lies another less important example of joint, if not
always cooperative, planning and construction: the Harvard
Bridge was built by Boston and Cambridge in 1887, but only
after the latter, piqued by two unsuccessful attempts to
obtain Boston's voluntary assistance, had secured legislature
3
forcing Boston to meet its share of the project's cost.
A current example of the complexities of joint planning in
the Metropolitan district is offered by the recently
announced proposal to improve traffic conditions by restricting
parking on certain arteries connecting with downtown Boston;
the development of this scheme required the efforts of 12
municipalities working under the guidance of a non-governmental
(1) Metropolitan District Commission: Development And
Organization, P. 4.
(2) Studenski: The Government Of Metropolitan Areas, P.
267 ff.
(3) Ibid. P. 44.
49
agency, the Massachusetts Safety Council, and the permanent
establishment of the scheme, which is to be operated on a
trial basis for a 60-day period in the Fall, will probably
require State legislature. It seems obvious that the
inherent difficulties of solvibg its traffic problem are
aggravated by the inability of the metropolitan district to
develop less cumbersome and complex planning procedures.
4
The numerous governmental units of the metropolitan
district are in general no more satisfactory as operational
than as planning areas, -for in countless cases their activities,
even when characterized by high innate efficiency, are robbed.
of effectiveness by conditions beyond the reach of their
authority. Thus, the attempts of the Chicago Sanitary
Commission to halt the pollution of Lake Michigan are nulli-
fied by the failure of numerous Indiana towns and cities to
treat the sewage which they empty directly or indirectly into
the lake; while the efforts of the Philadelphia Water Depart-
ment to provide the city with potable and preferably palatable
water are handicapped by the gross pollution, created by up-
state municipalities, which requires the use of both mechanical
(1) Leland: "Waste Through Multiplicity Of Governmental
Units", NTAB 22:. 163, March 1937.
50
and sand filters in the treatment of Delaware and Schuylkill
1
water. Other examples of municipal operations constantly
balked by the inadequacy of the operational area come readily
to mind: progressive and efficient health departments in all
our metropolitan districts are frequently hampered by border-
ing municipalities, careless and ineffective health work which
exposes the entire district to danger; and police departments
are thwarted by the respect they must accord the municipal
boundaries which criminals ignore. An historic instance of the
price of divided police administration is furnished. by the
utter inability of the Philadelphia area's seven or more
independent departments to control the 1835, 1844 and 1849
2
riots; while a contemporary result of the same division of
authority is indicated by the following quotation: "The city
of Evanston, Chicagots suburban neighbor on the north, finds
that its own automobile inspection system cannot solve all of
its traffic accident problems, since almost 41 of its auto-
mobile fatalities and half of its other motor accidents in-
3
volve drivers or vehicles from places outside the city." And
in the Boston metropolitan area at the present time "No one
(1) Jones: Metropolitan Government Pp. 60-61.
(2) Studenski, of.cit. P. 126.
(3) Lepawsky: Development Of Urban Government, P.29.
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knows how often the police of Medford fail simply because
they do not possess information already in the hands of the
1
Chelsea police. Since germs, criminal and fires to mention
only three offenders against civic order, do not recognize
municipal boundaries, the countless cities and towns of the
metropolitan district obviously constitute inadequate areas
for the operation of many services.
In addition to obstructing operations, the large number
of units, each possessing only a fraction of the metropolitan
district's population, area and wealth, hampers the efficient
employment of personnel and equipment and b1ocks' the degree
of specialization that the size of the metropolitan district
often justifies. Few of the Boston area's 84 different police
departments have sufficient budgets to command the specialized
equipment and personnel needed to combat crime effectively;
and it is unlikely that of the 1,731 go.vernmental units, which,
2
during the 1930's , guarded the health of the. Chicago region,
more than a very few had the benefit of modern tools and
techniques, for where units are so numerous it is obvious that
their areas and resources must be too small to support ex-
pensive equipment and highly trained technicians. It seems
(1) Harrison: Police Administration In Boston, P. 167.
(2) Leland: .o. citl., P. 162.
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likely, in fact, that the large number of small units not
only thwarts the degree of specialization demanded by the
conditions of modern urban life, but also creates an actual
excess of the more common types of equipment and worker. In
a study of 10 cities in the San Francisco Bay region it was
discovered that there were from 20 to 30 more fire companies
in operation than required by the application to the whole
area, considered. as a unit, of the fairly high standards of
1
the National Board Of Fire Underwriters. In 1928, Boston
and 39 surrounding cities and towns had 1 policeman for every
473 inhabitants or 9.7 policemen per square mile, while the
City of Los Angeles, with approximately the same area and
population, had only 5.3 policemen to the square mile and
2
over 605 residents per policeman. It is, of course, possible,
but unlikely, that Boston had either so many more crime
hazards or demanded so much higher a level of protection that
the greater number of police were required; however both these
figures and those cited for the San Francisco region, while
by no means conclusive, suggest the possibility that the
large number of governmental units existing within the
typical metropolitan district prevents efficient disposition
(1) Simon: Fiscal Aspects Of Metropolitan Consolidation,
P. 42.
(2) Harrison: o.cit., P. 163.
of personnel and. equipment and needlessly swells the aggregate
cost of providing a service.
5
Owing to the inability or unwillingness of any of the
individual municipalities to make the necessary expenditures,
it sometimes happens that the division of government among
a large number of units actually deprives the district of
services which its aggregate resources could easily support.
Although justified in few but the largest cities,- there are
numerous institutions, such as tubercular hospitals, trade
schools, botanical gardens and many others, for which the
metropolitan district's large population creates a sufficient
demand and an ample tax base; however, since in all but a
few rare cases the efforts to consolidate its resources and
requirements have been unsuccessful, the district often fails
to realize its potentialities as an area for the provision of
service and does not offer the specialized services and
facilities which its residents could use with great profit.
In the Boston area, for instance, only the City of Boston
itself has a large enough police department and budget to
provide the pre-service training which is needed by the
1
department's of all the region's cities and towns, while .in
(1) Ibid., P. 44.
,5t4
many other areas a similar inability to tap the taxable re-
sources of the entire district blocks the establishment of
modern centralized penal institutions and prolongs the life
of obsolete municipal jails which fail to provide the desired
segregation of juvenile and adult offenders and. the separation
of prisoners awaiting trial from those already convicted.
In some instances, the central city, by cooperative agree-
ment, extends to outlying suburbs the use of facilities they
themselves cannot afford to provide; thus the Cincinnati
police training school is used to a limited extent by neigh-
1
boring cities and Detroit's tubercular hospitals provide
treatment not only for its own residents, but also for people
2
living beyond city limits in Wayne County. However, since
such arrangements often prove burdensome financially to the
centralAard accord the suburbanites no voice in the admin-
istration of important services, they are not an adequate sub-
s-titute for the consolidation of the district's resources and
requirements which would create an adequate tax and population
base for the, support of specialized services.
(1) Lowrie: "Metropolitan Government In Cincinnati", APSR
30:950.
(2) Leonard and Upson: The Government Of The Detroit
Metropolitan Area, P. 44.
6The governmental disorganization which so obstructs
both planning and operations often reach its climax in
jurisdictional disputes which exemplify the whole ridiculous
confusion of the metropolitan district's government; the
following quotation describing a classic instance serves as
a fitting epilogue for this chapter: "On one occasion a
destructive fire took place in the narrow strip of land
known as 'No Man's Land' between Wilmette and Kenilworth,
and when the Evanston fire department, which had left its
territorial jurisdiction., attached its hose to a Kenilworth
fire hydrant and had the fire practically under control, a
police officer of the latter village turned off the water,
the contract between the village and the property owner
calling only for domestic water supply and not fire protection."
(1) Leland: Waste Through Multiplicity Of Governmental
UIt, N3-1322 C16659, Iar . 1937.
CHAPTER VII
The serious fiscal problems which vex most of the
metropolitan districts of the country are in a large measure
the product of the same confusion of governmental structure
which creates the numerous problems of planning and operations
that have been considered in the previous chapter.
Since the fiscal status of any municipality depends
equally on its revenue and its expenditure patterns, it is
apparent that the unnecessary expense created by duplication
of effort and inefficiency of operations will needlessly
swell the budget and thus aggravate the fiscal difficulties
of the metropolitan district's governmental units; by the
same token, any operational simplification and improvement
that reduces waste will lessen the aggregate demand for
revenue and to that extent alleviate the general problem of
governmental financing. The expenditure pattern, however, is
merely a statistical reflection of operational problems and
thus is little more than a -specialized but significant aspect
of the general topic of governmental planning and operation
to which the previous chapter was devoted. This chapter will
ignore expenditure in favor of revenue and attempt to describe
some of the difficulties experienced by governmental units
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within the metropolitan district in their continuing efforts
to raise sufficient funds to finance their operations.
The fiscal problems of the metropolitan districts can
be suggested by three broad statements about the political
units which share its government; first, these units vary
widely in area, population and. wealth and thus show marked
differences in their ability to.provide needed services;
secondly, they are so small in area and limited in authority
that there are only a relatively few sources of revenue which
they are free to exploit and, thirdly, they overlap so exten-
sively that lines of responsibility and of control become
obscured in the general governmental confusion.
2
The population increases which have swelled the size of
metropolitan districts have, in general, been considerably
more rapid in the surrounding areas than in the central city
itself. Since internal movement has also tended toward the
suburban areas, the older sections of many metropolitan
districts have experienced not only relative but absolute
loss; in the twenty year period 1919-1939, the population of
the County and City of London decreased by over 500,000 while
the outer area included in the Greater London Plan gained
over 2,000,000 inhabitants; the population of the City
actually began to decline in the 1850's while the County's
2
population showed no further growth after the 1901 Census.
6 out of the 12 wards of Boston began a decrease in population
as early as the decade 1857-1867, while in Minneapolis the
proportion of the population living within one mile of the
point of highest land value dropped from 49% in 1875 to only
3
11% in 1930. The 1940 Census presented impressive statis-
tical documentation of the flight from the central city,
revealing that whereas in the areas covered by the 140 metro-
politan districts 72.4% of the population were central city
residents in 1920, the figure had dropped to 68.0% two decades
later; within the 17 largest metropolitan districts,.
(750,000 or-more inhabitants in 1940), the central cities in
every instance contained a small percentage of the total
population than in 1930, and in the cases of Newark, Jersy
City, New Bedford, Elizabeth, Cleveland, Philadelphia and
St. Louis showed an absolute loss; in the .Boston metropolitan
area not only Boston but the five neighboring high density
cities, Chelsea, Revere, Everett, Cambridge and Somerville,
showed population losses ranging from 9.9% for Chelsea to
(1) Abercrombie: Greater London Plan, P. 27.
(2) Robson: The Government And Misgovernment Of London, P. 45.
(3) Jones: Metropolitan GovTeFment, P. 9.
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1.7% for Somerville.
While the population growth and movement of the past
several decades has reduced the central city's share of the
population and. wealth of the metropolitan district, it has
not benefited all outlying municipalities to the same degree;
some have experienced relatively little growth while others,
which have developed rapidly, have failed, to attract families
bringing any substantial addition to the city's per capita
wealth; on the other hand, the restricted suburban towns
which are a familiar feature of the metropolitan district
have not only increased their population but have also made
equally notable additions to their per capita resources.
As a consequence of the population growth and movement
of the past several decades the political units of the
metropolitan district show an increasing social differenti-
ation of which the variation in per capita wealth is but one
index: the outward movement "has been selective in character,
the more efficient elements of the population gravitating
in higher ratios than the weaker economic groups to the
margins of the city." The central city, which is often
called upon to provide services that are of benefit to the
entire distict, is gradually deserted by the people of means
and abandoned to the poorer elements who make increasingly
(1) McKenzie: The Metropolitan Community, P. 190.
0heavy demands on the municipality; need thus increases as the
ability to pay evaporates.
It is difficult to measure the per capita wealth of a
community and its ability to support governmental services by
even the most elaborate statistical methods; resort to such
simple criteria as assessed valuation or income returns per
1,000 population will naturally yield only a very rough
indication of a community's wealth; yet despite these limita-
tions, the examples that follow are of interest in suggesting.
the wide variation in wealth, and hence in ability to support
government, that is found among the typical units of the
metropolitan district.
In 1924. the per capita assessed valuation in the New
York metropolitan region ranged from $1,222 in' Belleville to
$7,444 in suburban Scarsdale; in the same year, the city of
Cleveland's assessed valuation was $2,674 per capita while the
corresponding figure for Shaker Heights was $35,919; the
following year, the Detroit metropolitan region showed a range
in per capita assessed valuations of from $1,447 in Hamtramck
1
to $9,064 in Grosse Point. In 1934 the richest school
(1) Studenski: The Government Of Metropolitan Areas In The
United States, P. 39. Since the valuations used in
computing these per capita figures have not been adjusted
to full market value, they are not completely comparable
even between municipalities within the same metropolitan
district.
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district in Cook County possessed an assessed valuation of
over $53,000 for each child in attendance, while the figure
for the poorest district was only $906; and'between the
lower and upper quartile there was a difference of over
$8,000 in the amount of taxable wealth available per child
in attendance. In the London area 1937 per capita ratable
values varied from low figures of E5.37 in Poplar and R5.27 in
Bethnal Green to highs of M46.55 in Holborn and L86.93 in
Westminster; as a consequence of such variation, it is not
surprising that the rates prevailing in 1935-36 should range
2
from 9/6 in the pound for Westminster to 17/4 for Poplar.
It is difficult to match these examples by more recent
figures since most available sources of information include
only the assessed valuations of the larger cities and omit
figures for the smaller suburbs which usually contain the
greatest per capita wealth. Although for this reason they
lack the extreme range of some of the examples given above,
the following figures, which are adjusted to approximate
1940 true value, give an indication of the variations in
wealth currently existing in- some of our metropolitan districts;
in 1940 Cleveland's adjusted assessed valuation per capita
(1) Jones: op.cit., P. 75.
(2) Robson: op.cit. P. 364 ff and map at end of volume.
was $1,710 while that of Cleveland Heights was $3,220; in
the San Francisco region, Alameda had. an adjusted per capita
valuation of $1,650 in contrast to a figure of $2,620 for
the City of San Francisco itself; within the New York metro-
politan district representative per capita adjusted assessed
valuations included figures of $1,260 for Elizabeth, $2,000
for Jersey City, $2,520 for New York City and $4,510 for
White Plains; and within the 43 cities and towns of the
statutory Boston Metropolitan District, unad.justed per capita
assessed valuations in 1940 ranged from $8,030 in Hull to
2
$960-in Stoughton. Although.these differentials usually
represent variations in the income standards of the municipal-
ities' residents, they sometimes arise more fortuitously; in
Weymouth, for instance, the 20 million dollar plant of the
Consolidated Edison Company adds over $800 to the per capits
assessed valuation and boosts the total figure to over ,2,000.
3
Since the metropolitan district is an economic unit it
is difficult if not impossible to secure any equitable division
(1) Figures computed on basis of annual report on tax rates,
etc. in cities of 30,000 population and over prepared by
the Detroit Bureau Of Governmental Research and published
in NMR. See "Comparative Tax Rates Of 301 Cities - 1940"
NMR 29: 792-810, Dec. 1940.
(2) BiiG 12: Table 16, P. 20.
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of its wealth among the variety of political units which
divide 'its government; the land values of the downtown section
have little inherent basis but are the reflection of the
large population and shopping demand scattered throughout the
entire district, while conversely the wages and salaries
that build attractive homes in the suburbs are usually earned
in the offices or factories of the downtown sections of the
district: the wealth of Shaker-Heights, Grosse Point or
Scarsdale is not created within the boundaries of these
suburbs, but is the product of the extensive and specialized
economic activity for which the entire metropolitan district
furnished the opportunity. Political organization, however,
fails to reflect this economic. unity, and wealth which is
the product of the interrelated activities of the entire
district is arbitrarily and inequitably allocated among
municipalities defined by boundary lines that have long since
lost their justification; many municipalities, as a. con-
sequence, face the initial fiscal problem of the generally
low income levels which make tax rates unproductive, while,
in contrast, other cities have no difficulty in developing
large tax revenues which nonetheless represent but a small
fraction of each taxpayers income. Like the economic inequal-
ities between individuals, the differences in the wealth of
various political units arise in part from extraneous
circumstances which can be controlled only with difficulty: -
to suggest the most obvious example, the land of a certain
town may be rich and productive while that of its neighbor
may be rocky and barren; however, within the metropolitan.
district, the differentiating effect of such circumstances is
unjustifiably increased by the failure of the political
organization to recognize the district's economic unity; as
a consequence there develop within the metropolitan area
towns possessing extremely unequal ability to capitalize
upon the Wealth created by the economic activities of the
entire district. Although an integral part of the same
economic unit and possessing similar service needs as the
wealthier cities, the poorer localities, owing to the artifi-
cial division of the district's wealth among a multitude of
of political units, must frequently reconcile themselves
either to a lower level of service or to a higher tax rate.
4
The problems arising from the inequitable distribution of
of wealth among the metropolitan district's governmental units
are aggravated by practical difficulties in devising taxes
which will prove productive for small units covering only a
fragment of the natural economic area. Long experience, in
fact, has shown that real property, which can be neither
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TABLE 8
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MUNICIPAL REVNUE
BY MAJOR SOURCE
AND BY SELECTED POPULATION GROUPS : 1942
397 Cities 55 Cities 200 Cities
Over 25,000 100,000- 25,000-
250,000 50,000
Taxes
General & Selective 65.2 68.3 66.0
Property
Sales & Gross 4.7 1.4 1.4
Receipts
Licenses & Permits 3.4 3.9 4.2
Other 1.7 0.5 0.5
Aid Received From
Other Govts 17.4 16.4 16.3
Earnings & Misc.
Charges For Current 3,9 4.7 5,2
Service
Special Assessments 1.2 1.4 1.7
Contributions From
Public Service 1.0 1.9 2,1
Enterprises
Other & Undistributed 1.4 1.6 2.6
Source: U.S. Bureau Of Census: Cit Finances 1942, Vol. 2
Topical Reports, No. 1, Revenue ~rT4,
1944. Ta o 4.
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concealed nor moved, is virtually the only form of wealth
that local units of government can effectively reach.
Admittedly, the property tax is only an imperfect measure of
ability to pay, but since land and improvements derive a sub-
stantial part of their value from the services provided by
the city, it seems only fair, especially in the absence of
any appropriate alternative sources of revenue, that real
estate should contribute substantially to the support of
government. The general property tax has actually evolved
into merely a tax on real property; past ~attempts by
municipalities to tax intangible personalty have proved so
unsuccessful, owing to the abundant opportunities for evasion,
that most states, including Massachusetts, have withdrawn
this form of wealth from liability to the general property
tax and subjected it instead to a state income tax. In
recent years, there has been a tendency to narrow further
the base of the former tax by the repeal or the lax adminis-
tration of the tax on tangible personalty, such as household.
furnishings; thus the general property tax, which was once,
as its name implies, a tax levied against all forms of
property, tangible as well as intangible, has deteriorated
over the years into a tax on only land and improvements.
Table 7 presents a summary picture of the relative import-
ance in 1942 of the various sources from which the 397 cities
TABLE 9
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF REVEUE BY MAJOR SOURCE
FOR SELECTED CITIES
IN THE BOSTON METROPOLITAN DISTRICT : 1942
Boston Malden Melrose Newton Revere
Taxes
General & Select- 69.1 69.1 72.2 71.7 78.3
ive Property
Sales & Gross - - - -
Receipts
Licenses & 2.6 1.0 0.2 0.5 2.0
Permits
Other 0.3 0.9 0.8 0.7 -
Aid Received From
Other Govts 24.8 26.5 20.4 22.8 19.6
Earnings & Misc
Charges For Cur- 1.7 1.2 4.3 1.5 -
rent Service
Special 0.4 1.0 1.1 1.5 -
Assessments
Contributions 0.2 0.2 1.0 - -
From Pub. Svc.
Enterprises
Other &c-Undis- 0.9 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.1
tributed
Source: U.S. Bureau Of Census: pity Finances 1942, Vol. 2,
a Re orts, No. 1, evenue _i 42
19447'OTaBIe 4
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of over 25,000 population derived their revenue; in these -
cities the tax on property furnished almost two thirds of the
total revenue and constituted about 87% of the sums raised
by taxation; expressed in another way, of the $49.79 average
per capita revenue in the 397 cities, $32.45 was contributed
by the tax on property. This pattern varies little with the
population group or with the geographical location of in-
dividual cities; 1942 figures show that municipalities of less
than 25,000 inhabitants raised 63.4% of their total revenue
2.
by the general property tax, while Table 9 indicates that in
the same year selected cities in the Boston area depended on
this single source for about 70% of their revenue.
5
In the effort to broaden the sources of their revenue,
municipalities have made repeated efforts to develop new taxes
only to find that their limited area makes successful adminis-
tration impossible; in 1938 Philadelphia experimented with a
2% sales tax which the panicky politicians repealed after 6
months owing to newspaper'opposition inspired by the department
(1) Bureau of Census: City Finances 1942, Vol. 2 Topical
Reports No. 1 City Revenue in 1942, 1944. Table 5.
(2) - - - :Governmental Finances in the United States
1942 United States Summary, 1945. Table 6.
stores; and although New York has been more successful with
the sales tax, this device is, in general, useful only where
the central city includes a large portion both of the area
and the shops of the entire metropolitan district; since it
is ringed by subsidiary shopping centers of considerable
importance, the imposition of such a tax in Boston might
easily so accelerate the decentralization of business as
seriously to harm the city.
Philadelphia has had more success with another taxation
device which may perhaps offer a solution to some of the
fiscal difficulties confronting municipalities; in 1939 the
city imposed a l1% tax, collected at the source by checkoff,
on all wages and salaries earned within the city by both
residents and non-residents and also on the compensation earned
1
outside Philadelphia by any of its residents; in 1942, with
total wages rising under the impact of wartime high employment,
this tax yielded $24,762,000 or 30.5% of the city's total
2
revenue. However, the widespread use of this tax will
probably be discouraged not only by such regressive features
as its exemption of unearned income and its constant
(1) City Ordinance of Dec. 13, 1939 enacted. under the terms
of Penn: Acts 1932, P.L. 45.
(2) Bureau of Census: City Revenue 1942, oa.cit. Table 2.
The tax was reduced to 1% in 1943.
percentage impost on wages, but also by the reluctance of
local politicians to add another to the already considerable
number of withholding taxes; two years ago a Massachusetts
Commission on Real Estate Taxation refrained from recommend-
ing the adoption of this tax and noted with calm understate-
ment that "the several withholding taxes now imposed by the
federal government on varying bases, have left both employers
and employees in a restive state of mind."
The sales tax and the modification of the income tax
represented by the Philadelphia measure are virtually the
only two taxes which municipalities might develop to relieve
the heavy burden on the property tax; however, both are
regressive and both may inhibit the natural growth of popu-,
lation and of business within municipal limits. Furthermore,
since a sales tax usually does not apply to the necessities,
such as food and drugs, which are purchased locally, the only
municipality within the metropolitan district that possesses
a sufficient taxable sales volume to yield any considerable
sum is the central city, which hesitates to impose a tax that
might drive business outside its limits; the wage tax carries
the similar danger that it may retard growth in localities
where it is used. and channel population into neighboring
(1) Mass: Special Commission on Real Estate Taxation and.
Related Matters: Report (House # 1800, 1945) P. 175.
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areas which are free from the burden. In this dilemma, the
general property tax, which is admittedly obsolescent, becomes
virtually the only profitable tax measure available for use
by local government.
Instead of developing new taxes, some municipalities
have made successful efforts to relieve the pressure on the
property tax by increasing the yield from non-tax sources of
revenue. Many cities are attempting to place on a self-
sustaining basis services, such as garbage collection, which
formerly were at least in part supported by taxation; a
number of numicipalities, of which Philadelphia is again a
conspicuous example, are charging a fee for the use of sewer-
age lines in an effort to finance the maintenance and im-
provement of this service without imposing a burden on tax'
revenue. In a few unusual instances, some cities have been
able to derive a. substantial portion of their total income
from municipal utilities; thus in 1942, contributions from
public service enterprises constituted 72.9% of the total
revenue of Rocky Mount, North Carolina, while for Jacksonville,
Florida, the figure was 53.6%; in the same year, charges for
current services yielded 39.9% of the total municipal revenue
in Burbank and 29.9% in Pontiac. However, reference to Table
7 indicates the rarity of these examples, for of the total
revenue of the 397 cities with a population of 25,000 and over,
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only 7.5% was derived from all earnings and other miscella-
neous sources; charges for current service aggregated 3.9%
of total revenue, while contributions from public service
enterprises and special assessments were respectively only
1.0% and 1.2% of the total.
6
Supplementing income from earnings and taxes is the
revenue derived from the state and federal financial assist-
ance programs which have developed so significantly during the
last 15 years. In 1942, such aid, principally in the form
of grants and of allocations from state-administered, locally
shared taxes, amounted to 17.4% of the total revenue of all
cities of 25,000 or more population; it cannot be questioned
that this considerable lightening of the burden imposed dn
other revenue sources has mitigated some of the pressing
municipal fiscal difficulties; on the other hand, it is true
that the policy of expanded state and federal financial
assistance has created a number of new problems which while
common to all municipalities appear in their most striking
form within the cities and towns of the metropolitan districts.
The most obvious of these difficulties arises from the
fluctuations in the annual sums distributed to the municipal-
ities; since the basis for awarding grants has undergone
7?
constant legislative change, while the amount derived from
the state-administered taxes and available for distribution
to municipalities varies considerably from year to year, the
cities are in no sense assured a constant annual sum which
can be safely anticipated in preparing budget estimates; in
fact, since the yield of many state taxes, such as sales,
liquor and most notably income taxes, vary directly with
business conditions, the municipalities may find that shared
taxes yield them least when rising welfare costs make their
needs the greatest. New York Cityts share of state-collected
taxes dropped from almost 84 million dollars in 1930 to 37
1
million in 1933; and in Massachusetts the amount received
by the cities and towns from various taxes administered by
the Commonwealth fell 31% from 46 million dollars in 1930 to
2
32 million two years later. A careful study of state-local
fiscal relations during recent years led the Boston Municipal
Research Bureau to the following conclusion: "Review of
experience with financial relations between Boston and the
Commonwealth since 1930 indicates that adverse trends have
been most evident at times when the City itself has been
under heaviest pressure. An increase in state-imposed
expense" (i.e. the state tax) "is likely to be accompanied
(1) Council of State Governments: State-Local Relations, P.132.
(2) Mass: Special Commission on Real Estate Taxation (1945):
o..cit. P. 207.
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by a shrinkage in state-shared taxes. And such a condition
is most apt to arise during a period of depression when the
taxpaying ability of local real estate is impaired."
Grants and shared taxes not only complicate municipal
finances by adding an unpredictable element to an already
intricate sphere; in addition, they often miss their full use-
fulness by failing to discriminate between the differing
degrees of need exhibited by various municipalities. An
inevitable consequence of this -oversight is that federal and
state funds are inequitably distributed, as is illustrated by
several instructive examples furnished by the Boston area.
For instance, although the amounts distributed to the
municipalities from the yield of the state gasoline tax are
by statute dedicated to the construction and maintenance of
local roads, the distribution takes little cognizance of the
considerable variations in the mileage and. traffic of the
different cities and towns; though each municipality receives
$50 for every mile of local road, the total so distributed
constitutes only from one ninth to one quarter of the additional
amount allocated on the basis of the assessed valuation figures
used in computing the state tax. As a consequence, the
municipality's wealth is more important than its road needs
(1) Boston Municipal Research Bureau: State-Local Fiscal
Relations Since 1930, P. 4.
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in determining its income from the gasoline tax; it is, in
fact, tacitly admitted that the distribution of gasoline tax
receipts has been transformed from a measure for the assist-
ance of road construction to a means for offsetting the state
tax. Certainly the formula used bears little relation to
road needs as was indicated by a recent legislative commission's
discovery that Wellesley, in 1941, received over 01,000 in
state aid for each mile of local road, while Danvers, with a
comparable population and area but only one quarter the
assessed. valuation, was allocated sums amounting to only 0440
2
per road mile; in a large and wealthy community like Brookline
or Boston the amount distributed on the valuation basis is
sufficient to cover over half of total road maintenance ex-
penditures, while in smaller and poorer communities it may
3
meet only a quarter of the annual expense.
The educational grants, which consume about one quarter
of the 20 million-dollar total raised by the state income tax,
offer another example of the inequitable allocation of state-
collected funds. Originally designed to encourage higher
(1) See Mass; Special Commission on Real Estate Taxation
(1945), op.cit. P. 309 ff.
(2) Mass; Special Commission Established to make an
Investigation Relative to Intergovernmental Relations,
Report, (House #1509, 1943) P. 15.
(3) Mass: Special Commission on Real Estate Taxation (1945):
op.cit. Table 18, P. 313.
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levels of teacher salaries .and preparation, the formula used
in determining distribution has now, owing to subsequent
legislature and modified conditions, the practical effect of
giving increasing financial aid as the municipality, through
superior local taxable resources, is able to attain a lower
pupil-teacher ratio; thus, for the school year ending June
1941, Brookline, with 21.9 pupils per teacher, received an
educational distribution amounting to $9.28 per pupil in net
average membership; on the other hand, Lynn, with a pupil-
1
teacher ratio of 27.7, received only $7.22 per pupil,. Para-
doxically, although the financial needs of the poorer cities are
patently greater, their share is proportionately smaller for
the very reason that their limited resources prevent them
from approaching the personnel standards set by the wealthier
communities.
Another example of the failure of formula to achieve
equitable distribution of state-collected funds is offered by
the legislature assigning a portion of the yield. from the
state's business and corporation taxes for distribution to
cities and towns as reimbursement for the revenue loss caused
(1) Ibid: P. 296 ff. See also: Mass: Special Commission
on Taxation and Public Expenditures: Report Part III the
Tax Structure, (House # 1703, 1938) P. 186 ff.
??T
by the 1936 removal from local tax rolls of the value of
machinery used in manufacturing. The peculiar feature of this
legislation is that such reimbursements are static; as a con-
sequence, municipalities from which all manufacturing
machinery has departed are still receiving aid while those
which have attracted industry since 1936 secure no financial
assistance, despite the manufacturing machinery they may now
1
possess. Similar legislative provisions in other states
often place adjacent municipalties on a markedly unequal
footing in their search for revenue: in Wisconsin, for
instance, where 65% of the state utility tax is returned to
the locality of origin, the Town of Lake, a Milwaukee suburb,
received a per capita reimbursement in 1934-35 of $33.00, in
contrast to an average figure of $2.65 for the. 17 municipal-
2
ities of the entire metropolitan district.
Even when the formulae controlling distribution of funds
are not so strikingly inadequate as in the examples just
considered, grants and shared taxes may still fail to meet the
real needs of the cities of a metropolitan region. The
matching grant is peculiarly subject to this criticism, for
(1) Mass: Commission on Real Estate Taxation (1945): o2.cit..
Pp. 302-03.
(2) Hansen and Perloff: State and Local Finance in the
National Economy, P. T.
since state advances must be matched at a fixed rate by
locally raised funds, the poorer communities where the need
for .help is greatest frequently cannot appropriate sufficient
amounts to secure the maximum state contribution. Alvin
Hansen has shown how similar conditions prevent the poorer
states from availing themselves of the full benefit of federal
grants and enable a rich state like Connecticut to secure
over three and one half times as much Federal assistance per
1
recipient of aid as an impoverished state like Arkansas;
virtually this same situation exists at the local government
level within the Boston metropolitan area, for the statutory
provisions by which the Commonwealth obligates itself to pay
one third of the cost of aid to dependent children in addition
to forwarding to the municipalities their share of federal
contributions, which in turn are also a percentage of total
cost, (up to a maximum), mean, that the wealthy community,
which can afford. to be generous in its aid measures, secures
more financial assistance from superior governmental levels
2
than the podr mfiunicipality with a strictly limited budget.
(1) Ibid: P. 167 ff.
(2) See BRMG 17, P.-39 ff. for an explanation of the formula
used in determining Federal and State contributions to
the aid to dependent children program.
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In addition to their failure to direct aid to the areas
of greatest need, the grants are sometimes guilty of buoying
up by financial assistance inadequate and obsolete government-
al units that preferably should be permitted to expire from
lack of resources, and, on other occasions, of tempting
municipalities, eager for state or federal funds, into making
unwise advances of their own limited tax revenues. Even where
the grant is not contingent on local matching it may still
saddle the city with continuing expense; thus the numerous
buildings constructed for municipalities under the WPA and
PWA programs often involved no local capital outlay, but ob-
ligated the city to annual maintenance and operation expend-
itures. Thomas Reed stresses these.significant dangers of the
grant and shared tax program in these words: "Federal and
state aids to local government has so far failed to solve the
problem of balancing local requirements and revenues having -
as in the case of schools - encouraged the continued. existence
of a multitude of ineffective local units, or - as in the case
of matching grants for roads, other public works and welfare--
increased local spending beyond the amount of aid provided."
Grants and shared taxes are, of course, useful means of
strengthening the fiscal position of cities and should not be
(1) Reed: Federal State Local Fiscal Relations, P. iii.
SO
condemned merely because of the remediable defects which now
characterize their operation; state and federal aid to
municipalities, first assumed significant proportions during
the depression emergency and is in many instances still
controlled by relatively experimental legislature that can
be perfected as more experience in a new administrative field
reveals effective methods of equalizing local financial re-
sources; nonetheless, it is indisputable that, as at present
administered, grants and shared-taxes complicate municipal
finances and at best mitigate but certainly do not solve the
fiscal problems of the metropolitan district.
7
It is safe to conclude on the basis of the discussion
contained in the previous pages that its numerous governmental
units are but poorly adapted for the raising of revenue in
the metropolitan area. In fact, it is no more logical that
these units preserve their fiscal autonomy than that a similar
independence be granted. to the wards or precinct of a city;
in 1944 Boston derived 31% of its real estate tax revenue from
1
Ward 3, which contains most of the city's business area, yet,
(1) Mass: Special Commission on Real Estate Taxation (1945)
op. cit. P. 176.
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owing to the popular acknowledgement of the city's unity,
there was no outraged protest when this income was used for
the benefit of the entire city. Unfortunately, popular senti-
ment has fallen behind the facts for while Boston and the
other cities of the district once constituted relatively
independent municipalities, population growth and technolo-
gical change have absorbed them all into the larger and still
generally unrecognized unity of the metropolitan district,
which should assume the fiscal authority now uneasily shared
by the cities and towns.
Handicapped by the inequality. of taxable resources and
the inability to develop adequate measures to tap it, the in-
dividual municipalities experience fiscal problems which are
compounded by the overlapping of governmental units within
the metropolitan district. Although considerable overlapping
is acknowledged, its extent is sometime surprising; in
1933, the town of Thornton, a suburb of Chicago was subject to
the property taxes levied by 41 political units, while the
towns of Proviso and New Trier, both located in the same
region, were taxed respectively by 38 and 25 different units.
In Cook County 368 jurisdictions overlap one another to form
584 areas in each of which property is taxed at a separate
(1) Leland: "Waste Through Multiplicity of Governmental
Units," NTAB- 22: 167.
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aggregate rate, and in Du Page County, Cook's neighbor to
1
the south,- 120 units overlap to form 210 separate taxing areas.
Even in the Boston metropolitan district where the fortunate
absence of separate school districts keeps the number of
governmental units to a notably small total, the inner 43 mu-
nicipalities are overlapped by the Metropolitan District Com-
mission and. the respective counties, as well as the state.
Since the assessments of these jurisdictions are incorporated
in the local levy, the Boston area is spared the trial of
multiple taxation, but though it is hidden, the overlapping
is is none the less real; the following figures break down the
1938 total tax rates of a few selected cities and towns to
reveal the extent of the financial burden imposed by the over-
2
lapping governmental units:
Total MDC County State "Local"
Tax Rate Assessment Tax Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate
Boston $41.30 $3.00 $2.44 $2.62 $31.24
Brookline 23.50 2.49 .86 2.40 17.75
Cambridge 41.00 1.41 1.62 2.73 35.24
Lexington 34.00 1.94. 1.55 2.60 27.91
Milton 27.20 2.46 .88 2.44 21.42
Especially when on such a small scale as in the Boston
metropolitan area, overlapping is not in itself intolerable and
(1) Jones: op.cit. P. 76.
(2) Computed from PD 16 (1938) Tables 18 and 19 and PD 92
(1938). The rates are, of course, hypothetical since the
MDC assessment and the state and county tax are allocated.
to the municipalities as absolute sums, not as i'nillage
rates.
83
may represent a practical means of distributing the cost of
different types of service; the objections to overlapping,
however, arise because of the financial confusion and irrespon-
sibility which are its usual companions and because of the
inequity which often governs the distribution of various
expenses.
The figures given above dividing into their component
parts 1938 tax rates for certain cities and towns contain a
suggestion of one type of inequity frequently arising from
overlapping: Boston, it was found, paid for the support of
Suffolk County a sum equivalent to the product of a $2.44 tax
rate, while neighboring Milton and Cambridge contributed the
yield of $0.88 and $1.62 tax rates to the support of their
respective counties. The high Boston rate is a reflection
both of statutory provisions and of the proportionately large
volume of cases handled by Suffolk County courts; owing to
statutes dating back to 1821 and obligating Boston to assume
the county's entire cost, the City, in 1938, contributed
towarrl County expense almost $250,000, or the equivalent of
an $0.18 tax rate, that under procedure observed elsewhere
throughout the state would have been the responsibility of
Chelsea, Revere and Winthrop, which also lie within the
County's limits. However, the fact that even this adjustment
would reduce the hypothetical Boston county tax rate to the
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still high figure of $2.23 indicates that Suffolk is an ex-
pensive County to maintain; since it is the center of the
metropolitan district and contains the state capitol and its
largest city, it is not surprising that over 75% of the cases
in certain categories should be contested in Suffolk County
Courts; und.er these conditions it is easy to understand the
high cost of its operations, but nonetheless difficult to see
why the whole of this burden should be placed upon Boston.
Other examples of the inequitable distribution of county
costs among its different areas are numerous; a recent report
discovered that in the Louisville region county residents
living outside the city limits received benefits in govern-
mental service aggregating over $700,000 more than the sum
they paid. in taxes - a subsidy which was, of course, provided
2
by the city portion of the country's population. A 1937 sur-
vey of government in the Atlanta area "found that aside from
numerous defects in the internal operation of each unit, the
worst features of the situation were that the city taxpayers
paid not only the full cost- of the city government but five-
sixths of the cost of the county government, and that certain
(1) See Boston Municipal Research Bureau: County Government
in Boston.
(2) Louisville Area Development Association: Finance
Committe6: Condensed Report of Cit-County Revenues and
Cost of Government.
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services such as health and police, which require central-
1
ized command for efficiency, were administered separately."
Although where the county lies largely within the metropolitan
district, it may be only just for the wealthier and. more
urbanized central municipalities to assume the greater share
of the cost of its government, it is unreasonable to expect
them to subsidize the county's outlying rural areas that are
perhaps the hinterland but not integral parts of the metro-
politan district. And it is in'any case unwise and expensive
to support the duplication of departments which is a usual
result of the overlapping of city and county within the metro-
politan district.
Since large scale consolidations have been so rare in
recent years, only estimates are available to indicate the
extent of the savings that might arise from a reduction in the
number of governmental units; this aspect of the subject will
be considered later in another connection and it only remains
at this point to note that a study of the Dallas region
indicated that city-county consolidation might secure annual
2
savings of $200,000, while the Cook County assessor estimated
(1) Darmstadter, Doris: "Metropolitan Atlanta" in National
Municipal League: C Growing Pains, P. 17.
(2) Bailey, Lewis W.: Dallas Weighs City County Merger" in
National Municipal League: City Growing Pains, P. 42.
some years ago that rationalization of governmental units
and efficient management would secure a saving of forty cents
on each dollar of public expenditure or an annual saving for
1
the entire Chicago region of $140,000,000. A study of
comparative adjusted tax rates appears to indicate that the
rates for consolidated city-counties are actually lower than
aggregate average rates for all cities in the same population
class; thus while the 1940 average aggregate adjusted rate,
including city, school, county and state taxes, for the
14 cities of 500,000 or more population was $28.87, comparable
figures for the consolidated city-counties in this population
group were as follows: Philadelphia $28.75, Baltimore
2
$30.34, St. Louis $23.29. and San Francisco $19.69.
Whatever the added cost borne by the metropolitan district
as a result of the overlapping of governmental units - and the
figure cannot be even reliably estimated without a considerable
expansion of existing information, it nonetheless remains true
that this overlapping complicates the budget process for the
individual units, hinders an appreciation of the total cost of
(1) Merriam, Parratt and Lepawsky; The Government of the
Metropolitan Region of Chicago, P. 127.
(2) Figures computed from"Comparative Tax Rates for
301 Cities - 1940" NMR 29: 792-810, Dec. 1940.
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government, obscures the pattern of governmental responsi-
bility and reduces the possibility of effective citizen
control.- In the Boston metropolitan district, for instance,
the municipalities often find their budget calculations
seriously distorted by the unpredictable rise and fall of the
state tax which has varied from a total of about 7 million
dollars in 1930 to over twice that sum in 1942. Although this
obstacle to realistic budgeting is avoided where each
governmental unit administers a'separate taxing system to
meet its own needs, this solution has the distinct disadvan-
tage of inconveniencing the taxpayer and preventing a real-
ization of the total cost of government within the metropolitan
district; in addition financial responsibility and effective
citizen control become progressively less attainable as the
number of fiscally independent units operating within the
district is multiplied. The problems of responsibility and
control arising from the large number of governmental units
within the metropolitan area- will, however, be discussed in
the next section, and. it is only necessary in conclusion to
emphasize their close relationship with the various fiscal
problems that have been the subject of this chapter.
CHAPTER VIII
The social and political problems of the metropolitan
district have such a complicated history that any simple ex-
planation is achieved only at the sacrifice of accuracy: the
tangled web of cause and effect can simply not be reduced to
a schematic pattern wi,thout a dangerous falsification of fact.
It is, for instance, unrealistic to single out certain problems.
as the outcome of the fragmentation of authority among the
metropolitan district's political units, for while plural
government has at least aggravated virtually all of the
district's problems, it can be assigned the exclusive re-
sponsibility for the creation of none.
In the face of this complexity, no attempt will be made
to evaluate the degree to which governmental disorganization
intensifies the many broad social problems which plague our
metropolitan districts; it must undoubtedly bear a large
measure of the blame for the ugliness and unhealthiness which
mar large areas of the metropolitan district; and it is
certainly instrumental in fostering and preserving the class
segration which is another of its more serious .defects. Yet
while not unrelated to governmental organization, these topics
involve a wide variety of considerations which are far beyond
the scope of this paper; this chapter will therefore be
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restricted to an examination of the divorce between the
citizen and his local government which is a direct consequence
of the division of authority among the metropolitan district's
large number of political units.
The Greek philosophers viewed politics as a noble art
and the 19th Century Federalists saw it as a fit career for
the rich, the well-born and the able, but largely owing to
the maladministration and corruption which have characterized
municipal government in the United States, the Twentieth
Century public regards it as a refuge for scoundrels. Admit-
tedly the views of the public lag behind the fact and still
reflect the muckraking agitation of the turn of the century;
as long ago as 1888 Bryce detected an improvement and wrote
that "no one who studies the municipal history of the last
decades will doubt that things are better than they were
twenty five years ago... Rogues are less audacious. Good
citizens are more active." However, though there has been
tremendous improvement in the quality of municipal government,
it has not yet been able to erase from the popular mind the
memory of the Tweed gang, the Philadelphia "gas ring", the
St. Louis "boodlers" and the other crooks and criminals of the
(1) Bryce, James: The American Commonwealth, MacMillan,
New York, 1891.7 vols.) Vol. I, P. 619.
late 19th Century who did so much to dirty the word. politics.
Corruption was then most flagrant in the large metropolitan
cities, while today's machine politics - the successor,,the
less subtle thievery of the 19th Century, also finds that the
metropolitan area's large population and disorganized govern-
ment provides abundant opportunities for both power and profit.
Politics should not and need not be disdainfully
abardoned to the dubious devices of the ward heeler and the
precinct committeeman; the business of government and especially
of local government, which has the stimulating appeal of
immediacy, should be a constant concern and intimate.interest
of intelligent adults. However, the complicated and unorgan-
ized governmental structure of our metropolitan districts does
little to arouse such interest and often even administers the
coup de grace in those rare instances where civic interest has
survived earlier discouragements. Within the limited area of
a suburb, the administration of governmental functions is
usually divided among such a Variety of autonomous or semi-
independent boards, commissions and districts, which supplement
and duplicate the work of the municipal corporation, that it
is difficult for the citizen to develop any clear comprehension
of local government's overall pattern; where, as in the metro-
Politan district as a whole, the existence of hundreds of
Overlapping, independent and competing units infinitely
.1
increases the pattern's complexity, it is -almost inevitable
that the average citizen's inability to understand the
structure should eventually sour into utter indifference
toward municipal government. Even such civic interest as does
survive these discouragements often becomes less effective by
its diversion from the central task of general government to
a preoccupation with the more limited and specific problems
which are the province of the independent districts and com-
missions; the limited amount of citizen talent which is at the
disposal of government may thus become preoccupied with the
solution of the problems, often more logically the task of
specialists, that confront the school district or the water
district, and neglect the responsibility, peculiarly the
citizen's, of formulating the policies which are to control
the entire' gamut of governmental activity.
An equally unfortunate effect of the multiplicity of
governmental units within the metropolitan district is the
narrow outlook'it fosters among both office holders and voters.
Municipal boundary lines, which have little reality beyond the
heavy dots and dashes on the map, create a deceptive sense of
independence and nurture among both the administrators and their
constituents a belief that municipal problems can be solved
in isolation; the politician does not pick up any votes by
Placating the neighboring communities, while the citizens are
often blind. to the realization that their own interests extend
far beyond the boundaries of the municipality in which they
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live. In the Boston district, for instance, social and
religious differentiation has been accentuated by the paro-
chialism fostered by the division of the area into a variety
of political units. A recent writer emphasizes that "The
cleavage between city and suburb that marks the tragedy of
Boston is a key fact and index of the social condition of the
community .. These suburban dwellers are Boston people who
moved away from the city. They have fine community house-
keeping. They are scandalized by Boston's Curleyism and its
steadily deteriorating educational system. They talk of
letting Boston Istew in its own juice' unaware that their own
livelihood is at stake. For these fine suburbs are only the
bedrooms of Boston. The kitchen and. pantry and counting room
are in the city, where suburbanites derive their livelihood,
many of them from dismal tenements of the city's poor.
However, owing to the political boundary lines which crosshatch
the metropolitan district, the citizens .of one suburb have no
voice and. usually no interest in the governmental actions of
either the central city or of neighboring residential commun-
ities; the boundary lines are like a horse's blinders re-
stricting civic vision to a limited area and blocking any view
(1) Lyons, Louis M.: "Boston: A Study in Inertia", in Our
Fair City, (ed. Allen, Robert S.) Vanguard, New York,
1947. Pp. 28-29.
wAt1c.~
of the larger problems of which those of the individual mu-
nicipality are but a minor part.
The number of political units existing within the metro-
politan district not only sti/fles civic interest and a metro-
politan outlook, but in addition divides responsibility so
widely that citizen' control of the business of government be-
comes indirect and tenuous. In the face of the proliferation
of independent and overlapping governmental units, the voter
finds it difficult to direct either criticism or commendation
to the right quarter; with a total of 1,731 separate units
dividing the administration of health functions in the Chicago
region, how can the citizen possibly detect which jurisdiction
should be blamed for inadequate service or which unit deserves
support by reason of its efficient functioning? Even simple
questions of fact are often made virtually unanswerable owing
to the large number of governmental units in operation within
the metropolitan district; in The Government of the Metropolitan
Region of' Chicago, Charles Merriam offers this astute observ-
ation: "Over and over again the. question recurred to all of
us: If it takes so much time and effort to acquire knowledge
of one relatively simple situation in the Chicago area, as for
example the number -of police available, or the annual expend-
itures of the Region, how can the busy voter by expected to
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exercise intelligent control over these complicated processes?"
The lazy, the inefficient and the dishonest politicians and
administrators are quick to utilize this confusion as a screen
for their own incompetence or corruption; positive action is
buried under reams of correspondence between overlapping or
competing jurisdictions; the pattern of responsibility is
deliberately confused by political legerdemain; and.meanwhile
bureaus stagnate and costs soar as inefficiency if not dis-
honesty take their toll.
The multiplicity of government existing within the metro-
politan area becomes in fact the .negation of government by
obscuring the pattern of responsibility and thwarting the
citizen control which-are its essence. Where governmental forms
become so complicated that they lose their responsiveness to
the public will, the individual either abandons all concern
with government or else seeks new means of making his voice
heard. The archaic and ponderous governmental disorganization
of the metropolitan district has provoked both of these re-
actions; the average citizen has made a virtue of necessity
and adopted an attitude of indifference toward municipal
government which is annually demonstrated by the low percent-
age of the eligible voters who trouble themselves to appear
(1) Merriam, Parratt and Lepawsky- The Government of the
Metropolitan Region of Chicago. P. xii.
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at the polls for municipal elections; at the same time,
numerous pressure groups, such as Citizens' Councils and
Taxpayers Associations, have arisen to supplement the tra-
ditional but now ineffective methods of maintaining citizen
control and to amplify the voices of those individuals who,
for a variety of reasons, are unwilling to see municipal
government slip completely beyond their influence. Clearly
the time is at hand to sweep away the governmental complexity
bequeathed the metropolitan district by an earlier period and
in its place to establish a simplified. organization which will
both enlist the interest of the individual and prove respons-
ive to his will.
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CHAPTER IX
A picture, runs the proverb, is worth a thousand words;
and often figures are worth many paragraphs. This chapter
represents an experimental attempt to outline in terms of the
statistics of a specific metropolitan district a few of the
more central of the problems, which, as the previous pages
have indicated,, arise from the fragmentation of governmental
authority among a multiplidity of units. Admittedly, the
attempt is a hazardous or even a futile one, since where
complicated social and economic problems are involved, figures
frequently let the vital facts slip through their net.
Statistics have many limitations and, of themselves, prove
nothing; 3 is absolutely more than 2, but 3 deaths become more
or less desirable than 2 only .when value judgement interprets
the statistics; at the risk of inconclusiveness, the dis-
cussion that follows constantly recognizes that figures have
significant limitations and are at best but guides toward what
must of necessity be subjective conclusions.
The Boston metropolitan district was selected as the
subject of analysis because of several distinct advantages
which it offers. Full and comparable statistical information
is available for all its cities and towns in the admirable
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series of- annual reports issued by the various departments
of the Commonwealth, and additional data can be easily ob-
tained at the various municipal offices; its problems are
acute, not only because of the large number of political units
which divide its government but because of the small percent-
age of its total population living in the central city of
Boston; and finally, its municipalities show a wide range in
per capita wealth and a corresponding variation in the cost
of their local governments. Few other districts in the New
England region offer as many advantages; the Providence dis-
trict is split by a state line which introduces an extraneous
jurisdictional problem and, in addition, makes the compilation
of comparable statistics extremely difficult; the Haverhill-
Lawrence-Lowell district is essentially an extensive densely
settled area rather than a social or economic unit, while so
relatively few people reside outside the limits of the central
city that.the Worcester district has not yet experienced any
considerable suburban problem; the Springfield-Holyoke and the
Hartford districts, on the other hand, lack the contrasts in
taxable wealth and in level of governmental expenditure that
is offered by the cities and towns of the Boston region.
Their number, of course, makes it impractical to consider
all of the 83 cities and towns contained within the Boston
metropolitan district as defined by the 16th Census; and indeed
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there is no necessity to strive for inclusiveness since the
inequalities existing between the municipalities of a metro-
politan region can be amply demonstrated by an examination of
only a few of their number.
The Inner Metropolitan District, which is established for
the purpose of analysis, contains, with the exception of
Canton, Hull and Nahant, all the cities or towns lying in whole
or in part within 10 miles of the State House; Hull and
Nahant are omitted not only because their peninsular position
in Boston harbor makes the land distance to the State House'
considerably more than 10 miles, but also because their large
summer population creates taxable values and service needs
that distort per capita figures derived from the permanent,
Census population; Canton is excluded because it is a partial-
ly independent sub-center with a large area of which only a
very small portion lies inside' the 10 mile radius. Of these
30 cities and towns, all but two have densities of more than
1,000 persons to the square mile; all are over 10,000 in pop-
ulation and all but 3 have 15,000 or more residents. Thus,
although it is by no means suggested that the Inner Metro-
Politan District is a completely unified area, nonetheless its
Cities, and towns do have certain important common character-
istics which makes their comparison justifiable; the District,
in fact, includes all the central cities and thickly settled
9 rA
TABLE 10
AREA, POPULA.TION AND DENSITY : 1940
30 CITIES AND TOWNS )
Area 1940 Pop 1940 Pop 1930 % Change Density
(Sq. Mi.) 1930-40 1940
Arlington 5.2 40,013 36,094 10.9 7,695
Belmont 4.6 26,867 21,748 23.5 5,841
Boston 43.9 770,816 781,188 - 1.3 17,558
Braintree 13.7 16,378 15,712 4.2 1,195
Brookline 6.6 49,786 47,490 4.8 7,543
Cambridge 6.3 110,879 113,643 - 2.4 17,600
Chelsea 1.9 41,259 45,816 - 9.9 21,715
Dedham 10.5 15,508 15,136 2.5 1,477
Everett 3.4. 46,784 48,424 - 3.4 13,760
Lexington 16.5 13,187 9,467 39.3 799
Lynn 10.5 98,123 102,320 - 4.1 9,345
Malden 5.1 58,010 58,036 - 0.1 11,375
Medford 8.2 63,083 59,714 5.6 7,693
Melrose 4.7 25,333 23,170 9.3 5,390
Milton 13.1 18,708 16,434 13.8 1,428
Needham 12.5 12,445 10,845 14.8 996
Newton 17.9 69,873 65,276 7.0 3,904
Quincy 16.5 75,810 71,983 5.3 4,595
Revere 5.9 34,405 35,680 - 3.6 5,831
Saugus 10.6 14,825 14,700 0.9 1,399
Somerville 3.9 102,177 103,908 - 1.7 26,199
Stoneham 6.1 10,765 10,060 7.0 1,765
Wakefield 7.4 16,223 16,318 - 0.6 2,192
Waltham 12.4 40,020 39,247 2.0 3,227
Watertown 4.1 35,427 34,913 1.5 8,641
Wellesley 10.1 15,127 11,439 32.2 1,498
Weymouth 16.7 23,868 20,882 14.3 1,429
Winchester 5.9 15,081 12,719 18.6 2,556
Winthrop 1.6 16,768 16,852 - 0.5 10,480
Woburn 12.9 19,751 19,434 1.6 1,531
TOTAL 296.7 1,897,299 1,878,648 1.0 6,395
Source: See Appendix B
suburbs of the Census metropolitan region, but excludes the
municipalities lying beyond the 10-mile ring, whose consider-
ably lower densities and smaller populations create commun-
ities of a somewhat, different type.
The figures given below compare the 1940 populations and
areas of the Census metropolitan district of 83 cities and
towns, the statutory metropolitan district including 43 cities
and towns and the Inner Metropolitan District of 30 cities and
towns; it will be noted that the latter contains almost 96% of
the population of the statutory district and over 80% of that-
of the larger Census area.
Population Land Area
1940 -Square Miles
83 Cities and Towns 2,350,514 1,062.6
43 Cities and Towns 1,980,221 456.1
30 Cities and Towns 1,897,299 296.7
In the analyses that follow, the use of 1940 and 1941 as
the base years has been dictated by three main considerations;
in the first place, the existence of accurate population
figures for 1940 makes it possible to derive reasonably reli-
able per capita figures for these two years without the
necessity for intezpolation between the Federal and the State
Censuses which are not in all respects comparable. Secondly,
detailed statistical information for these years is available
in published reports while generally the figures for later
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years have not yet been printed and are unearthed only with
great difficulty. Finally, statistics for years subsequent
to 1941 reflect wartime conditions and thus are not represent-
ative of the normal municipal revenue and expenditure
patterns. In the hope of reducing the effect of atypical
deviations from normal trends, two year averages covering
1940 and 1941 have been used in virtually all cases rather
than the figures for a single year.
2,
Table 11 presents a number of indices which give a good
indication of the relative wealth of the 30 municipalities of
the Inner Metropolitan District. Assessed valuation per
capita, which is used to rank order the 30 cities and towns,
is, of course, not a completely satisfactory indicator of
comparative wealth, for it measures the value only of real
property and is distorted by differences in assessing practices;
however, with the possible exception of ,Boston, it is unlikely
that there is enough variation in the percentage of true value
represented by assessed value in the different towns to
destroy the validity of these figures. And although assessed
valuation per capita fails to measure intangible wealth direct-
ly, and is thus only suggestive of general income level, it is
indicative of a municipality's ability to raise revenue through
102
TABLE 11
INDICES OF COMPARATIVE WEALTH : 1940
( 30 CITIES AND TOWNS )
Assessed
Value
Per Cap
1940-41
Brookline
Wellesley
Newton
Winchester
ilton
$3,034
2,892
2,408
2,183
2,135
Weymouth 2,078
Nesdham 2,058
Belmont 1,952
Lexington 1,951
Boston 1,922
Quincy 1,629
Dedham 1,601
Braintree 1,563
Everett 1,563
Cambridge 1,531
Melrose 1,521
Arlington 1,461
Winthrop 1,457
Watertown 1,449
Lynn 1,331
Stoneham 1,319
Waltham 1 306
Wakefield 1:?95
Medford 1,241
Malden 1,188
Revere 1,159
Somerville. 1,113
Chelsea 1,068
Saugus 1,063
Woburn 1,016
Federal
Income
Tax
Returns
/100 Pop
27*6
28.1
27.1
2203
29.*6
17.5
23.5
2509
20.6
16.9
22.0
18.4
22.5
1207
17.2
2307
22.3
2106
1840
16.9
1507
16.8
1609
1806
15.4
1103
14.8
1009
15.4
1306
Highly Occupied
Paid % Owner
Workers Occupied
/100 Pop
13.5
14*.6
12.2
10*7
109
6.2
10.*0
12.4
8.9
6.3
7.3
6.4
7.1
4.3
7.0
10.5
9.0
9.3
7.3
5.2
8.4
5.9
7.0
6.4
6.1
5.1
4.6
5.7
503
4.8
29.1
69.8
57.2
63.2
69.8
62.0
65.3
50.3
66.5
20.9
44,7
59.3
35.1
1901
57.5
48.9
43.9
37.1
28.6
54.2
34.*9
57.*1
43.0
36.2
36.1
26.2
22.8
62.9
53.8
Dwelling Units
Median Median
Value Rent
Owner Tenant
Occupied Occupied
$10,707
8,254
7,904
7,588
6,684:
3,973
6,207
7,264
6,008
3,954
5,101
4,473
4,733
3,393
3,937
5,508
5,552
5,652
5,077
3,837
4,585
4,743
4,416
4,677
3,701
3,450
3,336
2,993
3,536
3,479
$58.64
47.08
40.76
38.14
42.92
26.37
36.05
42.53
34.62
28.41
33.10
28.36
31.73
27.87
28.99
35.69
39.30
35.37
35.50
27*14
29.89
30*08
28.18
33.70
29.83
26.82
28.72
23*14
27*91
24.51
Source: See Appendix B
the general property tax which is. the mainstay of the local
tax structure. The number of Federal income returns per
100 population supplements the assessed valuations per
capita by furnishing a more direct measure of per capita
wealth, while the number of "highly paid" workers per 100
general population and the data regarding owner occupancy,
median rents and median home values provide more general
indications of a community's income level.
It is interesting but not surprising, to note the high
correlation between all six indices; with a very few excep-
tions, which can be quite readily explained, a high figure
in any one index assures a high level in all the rest. The
percentage of owner occupied dwelling units is the least
reliable figure in indicating general community wealth; :in
Saugus, for instance, which is very low in all other cate-
gories, the percentage reaches the relatively high figure
of 88.9% while in Brookline, which is one of the wealthiest
of the 30 municipalities, somewhat special conditions result
in an owner occupied percentage of only 29.1*. The other
indices, which are all intimately related to per capita
income, show a much closer correlation; in fact the only
significantly abnormal behavior is shown by Weymouth, which,
owing to the huge Consolidated Edison plant, possesses a
coni'4erably higher per capita assessed valuation than the
general income level, as suggested by the other indices,
would normally produce.
Although indicating only relative wealth and ability
to support government, the figures show a significant
inequality between the different units of the Inner Metro-
politan District; Brookline, for instance, has 3 times the
per capita assessed valuation of Woburn, and Wellesley
submits almost 3 times as many Federal income tax returns
in proportion to population as Chelsea; Somerville has
relatively only about 1/3 as many "highly paid" workers as
Newton, and Saugus has a rent level which is about half that
prevailing in Brookline. As a general conclusion it can be
stated that the 5 wealthiest towns, Brookline, Wellesley,
Newton, Winchester and Milton have from 2- to 3 times the
per capita resources of the 5 poorest municipalities,
Revere, Somerville, Chelsea, Saugus and Woburn; the other
cities and towns meanwhile display less striking but none-
theless significant variations in per capita wealth and
consequently in ability to support local government.
3
In the preceding section an attempt has been made to
show that owing to the considerable variations in the ex-
tent of their taxable resources, the 30 cities and towns of
the Inner Metropolitan District are unequally fitted to
raise the revenue needed to maintain governmental services;
the most extreme contrast, in fact, revealed Brookline with
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TABLE 12
AVERAGE DIRECT TAX PER CAPITA, TAX RATE
AND ASSESSED VALUATION PER CAPITA:1940-1941( 30 CITIES AND TOWNS )
Direct Tax Tax Rate Assessed Valua-
Per Cap tion Per Cap
Boston 77.11 $40.10 $1,922
Brookline 71.34 23.50 3,034
Newton 68.87 28.60 2,408
Cambridge 68.31 44.65 1,531
Wellesley 61.90 21.40 2,892
Lexington 61.23 31.80 1,951
Winchester 59.39 27.20 2,183
Needham 57.20 27.80 2,058
Everett 56.90 36.40 1,563
Milton 55.93 26.20 2,135
Belmont 55.24 28.30 1,952
Dedham 55.24 34.50 1,601
Revere 52.95 45.70 1,159
Weymouth 51.70 24.88 2,078
Quincy 51.69 31.75 1,629
MEDIAN 51.65 34.65 1,526
Arlington 51.60 35.30 1,461
Braintree 51.55 33.00 1,563
Medford 51.26 41.30 1,241
Chelsea 50.79 47.60 1,068
Watertown 50.44 34.80 1,449
Melrose 49,58 32.60 1,521
Malden 48.54 41.00 1,188
Waltham 47.26 36.20 1,306
Stoneham 47.22 35.80 1,319
Lynn 46.44 34.90 1,331
Somerville 45.73 41.10 1,113
Saugus 44.26 41.65 1,063
Wakefield 42.57 32.90 1,295
Winthrop 41,84 28.70 1,457
Woburn 36.14 35.40 1,016
Source: See Appendix B
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over 3 times the taxable wealth per capita of Woburn or,
in other words, with the ability to raise an equal sum
of money while imposing a burden only one-third as heavy
as that carried by Woburn residents.
One general and obvious consequence of this unequal
distribution of taxable wealth among the 30 cities* and
towns is that the direct tax per capita, and consequently
governmental expenditure per capita, tends to be higher in
the wealthier municipalities. Table 12, which presents av-
eraged direct taxes per capita, tax rates and assessed valu-
ations per capita covering the years 1940 and 1941, shows
that the localities with the highest per capita wealth have
also the highest. per capita direct tax; of the 15 municipali-
ties surpassing the median direct tax per capita of $51.65,
only Revere fails also to exceed the median per capita as-
sessed valuation of $1,526. On the other hand, of these
same 15 municipalities, 11 have tax rates which reveal rela-
1
tive financial effort, lower than the median of $34.65.
These figures indicate that at a smaller relative finan-
cial sacrifice by the individual, the wealthier towns are
(1) This statement assumes a non-existent constant rela-
tionship between true and assessed value in the 30 mu-
nicipalities; although it is true that assessments
represent different percentages of true value in the
different cities and towns, the variation is probably
not large enough to alter materially the validity of the
figures here presented.
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able to spend more per capita in providing governmental
services than the poorer cities and towns. Is there any
way of advancing a step further and establishing that this
lower per capita expenditure is also indicative of a posi-
tively lower level of service, or conversely,that the
greater per capita expenditure secures the wealthier towns
either more or better governmental service?
The difficulties of attempting any measurement of gov-
ernment are so formidable that positive conclusions become
virtually impossible. A business corporation can evaluate
operations by reference to the ledger, but despite some
critics of government who maintain that it can and should be
reduced to a profit and loss basis, a municipal corporation
cannot be appraised in terms of dollars and cents, since
its business deals with social even more than economic values;-
the loss, or expenditure, can be measured in monetary terms,
but no units have yet been devised to measure the profit
that accrues in social well-being. The tax rate, which,
where the taxable base is the same, indicates the relative
financial effort of different municipalities, is perhaps a
good index of intent, but only an imperfect measure of re-
sults; while total governmental expenditures, which moves
nearer to appraising results, still affords no measure of the
relative wisdom and efficiency with which different cities
spend their money.
A slight simplification of the problem is achieved by
abandoning the evaluatian of government as a whole in favor
of the measurement of the varied services it performs; yet
here again the problem is far from simple since there are so
1
many valid approaches to the task of measurement of service.
Each governmental service and function may be considered
to have tacitly defined objectives which are the composite cre-
ation of policy decisions of voters and officeholders over long
periods of years; meat inspection hae/the simple objective of
preventing the sale of tainted meat, while free education has
the infinitely complex objective of stimulating the development
of "good" citizens and individuals. The need for a service in
any given locality is obviously a corollary of its objective:
where considerable amounts of bad meat are being sold the need
for inspection is pressing, while in other localities it may
be virtually nonexistent. This suggests that a service may be
appraised first in terms of the extent of the need it is de-
signed to fill and secondly in terms of the degree to which
it actually succeeds in meeting this need; this latter task may,
at least in theory, be accomplished by measuring performance,
effort cost, efficiency and finally results. The measurement
of performance indicates the amount of service provided,
for example, the number of fire calls answered or the
miles of street cleaned; measurement of effort shows
the man and equipment hours involved in the perform-
ance of a service:- the number of men and trucks
()See Ridley and Simon:- Measuring Municipal Activities
for fuller discussion of the problems briefly considered
in these pages.
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needed to clean a given mileage of street, while measure-
ment of cost shows the expense, usually in unit terms, of
performing a given service. Efficiency is measured to de-
termine not merely the quantitative amounts of labor and
money that are expended in the performance of a function,
but the effectiveness of their use to achieve the objec-
tive; while the measurement of results indicates the extent
to which the objective of a service is achieved. (Although
they may at first glance appear 'identical, the distinction
between the measurement of results and of efficiency becomes
clear if it is recalled that an objective may be wastefully
attained; the prevention of the sale of tainted meat, for
instance, may be achieved only at an unnecessarily large
expenditure of money and labor.)
It is rarely feasible even with the use of the most
elaborate techniques to provide statistical measurements
which conform to the neat distinctions outlined above. It
is almost impossible, for instance, to present an absolute
indication of need since the need at any given time will
reflect not only the conditions created by the environment
and society, but also the effectiveness of municipal efforts
to modify them; fire loss, for instance, measures only
relative need since it is as indicative of the work of the
fire department as of a locality's inherent fire risks and
dangers. In the same may, the measurement of either effi-
ciency or results, which are the two most significant
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indices of municipal service, can be approached only through
a complicated correlation of previous measurements of need,
performance, effort and costs.
Drastic assumptions and simplifications have of necess-
ity been made to allow the measurement of service by statis-
tical techniques sufficiently simple to be practical within
the limits of this study. In general, some quantitative in-
dication has been sought of the need for any of the services
considered; to use the simplest example, the number of miles
of local road has been used to suggest the relative need
of the different cities and towns for street cleaning serv-
ice. Unit expenditures have then been derived to indicate
the adequacy of the service provided, larger unit expendi-
tures being taken to demonstrate the provision of either
more service or better service. This interpretation of unit
expenditures involves two critical and vulnerable assumptions:
first, that efficiencies and secondly, that price levels
are identical in all the 30 municipalities. Admittedly this
is far from the case; comparable positions do not command uni-
form salaries throughout the area, nor do the same materials
always secure the same price; differences in efficiency are
less easy to demonstrate but it is unquestionable that some
of the municipalities in the district have a greater ability
to stretch their tax dollars. However, although the propo-
Sition is not subject to easy demonstration it is believed that
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the economic competition existing within a metropolitan dis-
trict tends so to reduce these variations in efficiency and
price level that, though still considerable, they are not
sufficient to invalidate the figures and conclusions which
follow.
4
Table 13, which lists the average 1940-1941 road mainte-
nance expenditures of the 30 cities and towns of the Inner
Metropolitan District, reveals little correlation between
need, as indicated by total road mileage, and performance or
results, as suggested by per capita expenditures. It is ,true,
however, that traffic volume is perhaps even more influen-
tial than total mileage in determining the need for road main-
tenance: the crucial importance of this factor is, in fact,
clearly demonstrated by the direct variation of expenditures
per road mile with distance from the State House. The
highest expenditures are found in Boston itself, which is,
of course, the destination of traffic originating throughout
the entire metropolitan area, and in Chelsea, Cambridge and
Brookline, which contain some of the principal routes to
downtown Boston and consequently receive daily a large
volume of transient traffic.
Expenditure per mile also mounts with density, which
as it increases concentrates more car owners within a given
112
TABLE 13
AVERAGE EXPENDITURES FOR ROAD MAINTENANCE : 1940-1941
30 CITIES AND TOWNS )
Average Expenditure Mileage
Per Cap Per Mile 1940
Newton $8.90 $3,060 202.7
Lexington 8.08 1,505 60.3
Wellesley 7.88 1,810 65.9
Brookline 7.13 3,940 90.0
Stoneham 6.79 1,995 36.6
Winchester 6,47 1,840 53.0
Dedham 6.30 1,950 50.1
Milton 6.05 1,865 60.9
Weyiouth 5.94 1,655 85.7
Needham - 5.86 1,245 58.6
Boston 5.45 5,710 730.0
Cambridge 5.12 4,850 116.9
Arlington 4.72 3,065 61.6
Braintree 4.42 1,055 68.4
Belmont 4.36 2,045 56.9
MEDIAN 4.32 1,975
Wakefield 4.28 1,215 57.3
Medford 4.21 3,310 80.6
Quincy 4.20 2,320 1413
Watertown 4.17 2,320 63.7
Melrose 3.98 1,740 57.9
Chelsea 3.91 5,270 30.6
Winthrop 3.67 1,925 31.9
Malden 3.32 2,305 83,5
Saugus 3.25 1,055 45.5
Woburn 3.14 764 81.2
Waltham 3.13 1,410 85.8
Lynn 3.12 3,735 82.0
Everett 2.63 2,430 50.6
Somerville 2.50 2,945 87.0
Revere 2.08 1,620 44.4
Source: See Appendix B
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area; at the same time, the per capita expenditures of the
densely populated inner group of cities is in general lower
than that of the outer suburbs since the former can spread
the total cost per mile among a larger number of taxpayers.
With the exceptions of Stoneham, Newton and Quincy, all the
municipalities exceeding the median expenditure per mile
of $1,975 have a density over 5,000 persons per square mile;
on the other hand, 8 of these same 15 municipalities have
per capita rates of expenditure -less than the median of $4.32.
The per capita expenditure is consistently high in those
very cities and towns which earlier tables have shown to
possess the greatest taxable wealth and consequently the
greatest ability to pay; it is striking that all but two of
the cities and towns spending more per capita than the median
figure of $4.32 should also have a 1940-41 per capita assessed
valuation greater than the median. Although in some instances,
notably the cases of Newton, Cambridge and Boston, the high
per capita expense represents an answer to the considerable
need created by large mileage and heavy volume; in other
cases, where mileage is small and traffic slight, it must
evince the desire of the community for superior roads; by
the same token, it seems likely that the small expenditures
of some of the poorer municipalities must result in an infe-
rior level of service: Woburn has a greater road mileage
than Wellesley and probably a roughly comparable traffic
11.4
volume, yet its expenditures per mile are less than half
the figure for the wealthier suburb, and Somerville, with
a considerably smaller road mileage and a similar traffic
volume, spends less than half as much per capita and
somewhat more than half as much per road mile as the neigh-
boring city of Cambridge.
Perhaps two tentative conclusions can be drawn from
this table; first, that the inner cities bear a heavy ex-
penditure per road mile owing, at least in part, to the
heavy volume of transient traffic they receive from the
outlying areas; and second, that per capita road expendi-
tures are often adjusted more to the municipality's wealth
than to its need.
5
Table 14 lists street cleaning expenditures, on both a
per capita and per road mile basis, for the 14 cities of the
Inner Metropolitan District; the towns are, of necessity,
omitted from this table since figures for their expenditure
are not available. In general, the larger cities tend to
pay more per capita for the provision of this service than
the smaller ones, although Lynn, Malden and Somerville fall
below the median. Expenditure per mile of street seems to
decrease with distance from the State House, although Lynn
forms a striking exception. The data in this table is rather
inconclusive and does not justify any inferences regarding the
relation of performance and cost to need.
TABLE 14
AVERAGE EXPENDITURES FOR STREET CLEANING : 1940-1941
14 CITIE)
Average Expenditure
Per Cap Per Mile
Newton 0.86 $295
Boston 0.83 834
Quincy 0.81 445
Waltham 0.61 277
Cambridge 0.60 572
Chelsea 0.60 810
Medford 0.37 291
MEDIAN 0.34 293
Lynn 0.30 360
Malden 0.30 206
Everett 0.29 270
Melrose 0.27 118
Somerville 0.25 296
Woburn 0.17 40
Revere1  0 0
Source: See Appendix B
1: Revere apparently makes no expenditure for cleaning its
streets.
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6It is diff icult to derive any statisti cal evidence of
the need of a locality for recreation facilities; juvenile
delinquency rates and even certain health statistics have
been sometimes used to cast indirect light on the adequacy
of a municipality's recreation program, but the relationship
is so inferential that the technique has doubtful validity.
In the absence of any practical method of deducing the spe-
cific needs of the individual cities and towns of the district,
it is perhaps safe to predicate a general need, based on
National Recreation Association standards, of at least 10
acres for each 1,000 inhabitants, noting meanwhile that this
need is considerably more-urgent in densely populated areas.
It is, of course, no surprise to find that numerous cit-
ies and towns in the Inner Metropolitan District have grossly
inadequate park "acreages and are thus unable to provide a
satisfactory recreation program despite the sums they lavish
on maintenance and supervision. Although the acreages given
in Table 15 are based on a liberal interpretation of the
word park, only 5 of the municipalities satisfy the need for
1 acre of park per 100 general population. In many instances,
the cities fail to provide even 1 acre for every thousand
persons; Everett, for instance, has 1 acre of municipal park
for every 1,732 persons, while for Braintree and Somerville
the comparable figures are 1,637 and 1,295. Although Braintree
lyE,
TABLE 15
RECREATIONAL MAINTENANCE EXPENDITURES & FACILITIES: 1940( 25 CITIES AND TOWNS )
Maintenance Expenditure
Per Cap Per Acre
Parks
Number Acreage Pop/Acre
Brookline
Melrose
Winchester
Lexington
Boston
Cambridge
Newton
Lynn
Wellesley
Belmont
Malden
Chelsea
Quincy
MEDIAN
Stoneham
Milton
Revere
Watertown
Weymouth
Wakefield
Arlington
Somerville
Braintree
Woburn
Everett
Waltham
$2.24
1.78
1.71
1.26
1.23
1.23
1.15
0.96
0*88
0*71
0.63
0*57
0.55
0*55
0.47
0.40
0*.34
0.30
0.30
0*24
0.22
0.22
0*12
0*08
0.05
0*05
$405
158
232
101
252
830
174
49
64
202
486
540
146
176
255
176
311
228
109
11
72
303
190
10
85
7
2
2
46
19
33
16
228
40
32
29
22
10
16
22
27
15
7
38
16
8
10
29
16
5
15
8
2
2
2
276 180
286 88
111 136
140 80
3,7001 208
165 1 673
329 151
1,940 1 50
209 73
95 282
61 951
44 948
289 262
20
43
38
46
65
350
122
76
10
186
27
287
538
440
906
770
370
47
328
1,295
1,37
106.
1,732
135
Source: See Appendix B
1: Includes either out-of-city areas and/or misc, non-res-
idential open areas such as water reservations or munici-
pal cemeteries.
2: Recreational expenses for maintenance and outlay in these
municipalities are not given separately; the computed
figures are thus based on total rather than merely on
maintenance expenditures.
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is an exception, the most deficient municipalities are gen-
erally those of highest density and smallest fiscal ability,
while the thinly settled towns exhibit the largest amount of
park area in proportion to their populations. It is true
that these figures are based only on local park acreages and
ignore .the areas of State reservations and Metropolitan
District Commission parks; however, since the more important
of these areas are on the periphery or beyond the limits of
the Inner Metropolitan District, their existence does not
make good the failure of a number of communities to supply
adequate local recreation facilities. In addition, the
distribution of such Metropolitan Parks District acreage
as does lie within the area usually is of least benefit to
those municipalities where the need is greatest; Everett,
for instance, has no M. D. C. parks, while Somerville con-
tains only 5.9 acres; Quincy, on the other hand, inclui es
over 2,000 and Milton over 1,800 acres of Metropolitan Dis-
trict park.
Not only do the area figures reveal a marked inequality
between the local recreation facilities provided by different
municipalities, but, in addition, the 1940 maintenance ex-
penditures per acre show a similar widspread in the sum
devoted to the provision of recreational programs and the
care of properties. In general, there is a tendency for
the high density cities, which possess inadequate areas, to
spend a considerably larger sum per acre than the smaller
110
suburbs which have a greater relative acreage; probably
the larger expenditures represent the cost of more inten-
sive usage and of more elaborate supervision,
The per capita expenditure figures do not reveal any
distinct pattern, although most of the cities with very low
taxable resources, Revere, Somerville and Woburn, for in-
stance, also show low per capita expenditures, while some
of the wealthier cities and towns, notably Brookline and
Winchester, reveal high figures. With the exception of
these cases, there is, however, little correlation between
taxable wealth and per capita expenditures; although it
falls just below the median in per capita assessed valua-
tion (1940-1941), Melrose, for instance, shows the second
highest per capita expenditure ($1.78); on the other hand,
only the small sum of $.30 per capita was spent for recrea-
tion by the wealthy town of Weymouth.
It seems justifiable, in conclusion to emphasize the
existence of a vast inequality between the recreational
opportunities 'offered by different municipalities in the
metropolitan region; these inequalities, however, spring not
so much from variations in per capita expenditure, although
these certainly are present, as from the initial significant
differences in the recreation acreage available relative to
population. In general, those municipalities with the small-
est proportional amount of park area are the thickly settled
inner cities many of which are handicapped by inadequate
taxable wealth in any effort to increase recreational
acreages.
7
Only by an exhaustive examination of such elements
as building laws, structural conditions and type usage,
it is possible to reach any approximation of the amount of
fire protection, as measured in terms of equipment, personnel
and fire streams, that is needed by a given municipality.
Any less complex indicators of need, for instance the num-
ber of building fires or the loss per fire, reflect not
only the inherent need, as determined by physical conditions
of usage and construction, but also the amount and quality
of the existing protective service. Notwithstanding this
qualification, the indices suggested above have a rough
validity which justifies their use in Table 16; for although
they fail to measure inherent need, they suggest the extent
to which it exceeds the level of performance provided and
thus serve as indicators Of relative or residual need.
Although the ratios tend to be slightly greater in the
high density industrial cities, the number of building fires
per 1,000 population does not reveal any clear pattern of
relative need; if the cities with the two lowest and the two
highest rates are temporarily neglected, the remaining muni-
cipalities exhibit fairly uniform ratios ranging from a low
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of 2.9 in Melrose and Medford to 5.6 in Lynn; however,
the extremes show Cambridge with a ratio over 8 times
as large as that of neighboring Watertown, which might be
expected to present comparable problems of fire protection.
Thus although the building fire ratios suggest the exis-
tence of relative differences in need, they offer little
explanation of their origin.
The ratios for fire loss for each $1,000,000 of build-
ing assessed valuation clearly suggest, however, that a
considerably greater need for fire protection exists in the
high density industrial cities than in suburban localities;
Chelsea, with a figure of $681 has the highest ratio followed
in order by Boston, Lynn and Revere; at the other extreme,
Newton has a low rationof only $82 while the figures in
both Brookline and Arlington are under $100.
The figures in the table also indicate that it is these
same high density cities where the need is greatest which
are making the most effort in terms of per capita expenditure,
to provide satisfactory fire protection; however, the range
in per capita expenditures is not as large as in the case of
other functions already considered; if Brookline with a
high figure of $6.86 and Arlington and Waltham with low
figures of $3.17 and $3.19 respectively are omitted, Chelsea's
high figure of $5.31 is only 50, greater than the remaining
low of $3.50 in Quincy. Yet within this rather limited range
TABLE 16
AVERAGE OPERATING EXPENDITURES OF FIRE DEPARTMENTS
AVERAGE NUMBER OF FIRES & AVERAGE LOSS : 1940-1941.
( 17 CITIES AN'D TOVINS OF 25,000 POP OR OVER 1940 )
Expenditures
Per $100,000
Assessed
Bldg. Value
Pop/FD
Employee
Bldg
Fires
/1,000
Pop
Loss Per
$10O, 000
Bldg AV
Brookline
Chelsea
Everett
Lym
Cambridge
Boston
Malden
Revere
Newton
MEDIAN
Melrose
Somerville
Belmont
Medford
Watertown
Quincy
Waltham
Arlington
$6.86
5.31
5*25
5.02
4.90
4.66
4.43
4024
4.15
4.15
4.11
3.96
3.94
3091
3.82
3.50
3.19
3.17
$374
726
498
577
524
497
535
587
266
424
376
510
269
424
352
338
365
284
SOurce: See Appendix B
1: Estimated
2: Based on insuranoe loss only
3: Based on 1941 figures alone
Average
Per Cap
97
681
251
506 1
221
509 2
227
407
82
160 2322
147
359
451
457
456
492
500
559
515
585
724
625
686
610
622
680
805
779
10.1
4.5
3.4
5.6
1005
5.5
4.2
3.8
4.0
2.9
4.3
4.7
2.9
1.3
5.2
4.4
1.4
145
126
429
288
883
the effect of density is apparent; the 7 communities with
the highest per capita expenditures all have densities
exceeding 7,500 persons per square mile and in 5 of the 7
the figures rise above 10,000 per square mile.. On the
other hand, in the lower density suburban or semi-suburban
municipalities, such as Belmont of Waltham, per capita costs
tend to drop. Since these high density municipalities, where
per capita expenditures and need for protection are greatest,
are also in some instance, exemplified notably by Chelsea,
Everett, Lynn and Revere, the very communities with the most
inadequate tax base, it is obvious that satisfactory protec-
tion imposes a heavy burden on the individual taxpayers;
although it has only one-third of Brookline's per capita
wealth, Chelsea spends per capita for fire protection only
20 less than the wealthier locality; in other words, Chelsea
taxpayers make over twice as great a financial sacrifice to
secure a per capita expenditure level which still falls below
that of Brookline. Fire protection obviously furnishes a
striking example of a service for which the need and the
ability to pay bear little relationship.
8
The number of crimes committed in any municipality is
as indicative of the adequacy of its police protection as of
the nature of its social and economic conditions; consequently
the crime rates listed in Table 17 reflect not absolute or
inherent, but residual need remaining unsatisfied after a
given level of police protection has attempted to meet an
initial need conditioned by such factors as population
density, racial and national stock, economic status and
general level of individual and civic morality.
With certain significant exceptions, the number of
crimes per 100,000 population is higher in the densely
populated industrial cities than in other parts of the
Inner Metropolitan District, with such cities as Boston,
Cambridge, Chelsea, Lynn, Revere and Somerville showing high
rates in all or most of the four crime categories listed in
the table. Revere, for instance, shows the highest robbery,
the 2nd highest burglary and a high auto theft rate, while
Boston has the highest auto theft rate and relatively high
ratios in the other categories. On the other hand, there
are significant exceptions to this general pattern; owing
in all probability to its high income level, Brookline has
the greatest burglary rate and a larceny rate which is sur-
passed only by the extremely high figure of Winthrop. A
few of the other suburbs show somewhat high rates most commonly
in the burglary and less often in one of the other categor-
ies; Milton and Braintree, for example, both have rather
high burglary rates, while Wakefield shows a fairly high
larceny figure.
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TABLE 17
AVERAGE OPERATING EXPENDITURES OF POLICE DEPARTMENTS
AND AVERAGE CRIME RATES : 1940-1941
( 28 CITIES AND TOWNS )
Per Cap Pop/Police
Operating Dept
Expenses Employee
Offenses Known/100,000 Pop
Robbery Burglary Larceny Auto
.Theft
Boston
Brookline
Cambridge
Newton
Milton
Winchester
Malden
Quincy
Belmont
Chelsea
Lexington
Wellesley
Lynn
Watertown
$7.22
6.34
4.88
4.79
4.52
4,25
4.09
3*93
3.92
3.90
3.76
3.75
3.60
3.56
MEDIAN 3.51
Somerville 3.46
Melrose 3.44
Arlington 3.39
Medford 3.38
Needham 3.35
Dedham 3.25
Revere 3.13
Braintree
Waltham
Winthrop
Stoneham
Wakefield
Woburn
Saugus
3.07
3,03
2,94
2.83
2.66
2.38
2.32
317
392
473
489
535
627
545
499
567
542
660 2505
590
710
682
617
718
706 2
692
681
684
781
581
797
978
764
1,460
901
33.3
19,1
26.2
1.4
13.4
0
32.7
26.4
7.5
23.0
8,9
13.2
31,6
701
17.7
15.8
5.0
11.1
4.0
6.5
49.4
6.1
6.5
9.0
0
21,6
2.5
20.3
128
596
334
236
371
2 .699362
2 257
171
331
209
165
391
168
424,.
263
214
192
141
93.5
438
321
234
335-
107
219
213
276
82,3
155.
46.6
(1)
3006
76.42
82.6
2
43,6
7002
3 66.886.0
146.
31.1
32.3
57.3
27,4
32.4
12.1
38.7
55.1
36.7
4901
242
18,6
89.4
60.9
20.
422
224
337
104
48.1
23.2
198 2
2 97.02
31.8
279
3 46.0333.0
150,
55.0
163
98.9
42,3
65.8
24,1
45,1
246
67,3
76.4
2909
37,2
92,2
157
97,8
Source: See Appendix B
1: Not available
1941 figufe not available to permit averaging. 1940 figure given.
3* Data upon which to compute rates not available for 1940 or
1941. Figures for 1942 given.
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Although there is a clear difference in the protection
needs of the central and the suburban cities and towns, it
fails to be reflected in their per capita expenditures.
Although some of the high density industrial cities spend
more per capita than the median figure of $3,71, a number
of the wealthier residential suburbs, notably Newton, Milton,
Winchester, Belmont, Lexington and Wellesley, also exceed
the median. Among the high density cities, Somerville,
Medford and Revere spend less than the median per capita
amount, while a few of the wealthier suburban municipali-
ties, like Needham and Dedham, also fall below the median,
These figures seem to warrant several tentative con-
clusions. In general, the higher density cities need more
extensive police protection than the open residential lo-
calities and in many cases attempt to meet this greater
need by per capita expenditures above the median figure;
on the other hand, several of the wealthy suburbs, exceed
the median by considerable amounts, while Saugus, Woburn,
Wakefield, Stoneham are among the poorer suburban communi-
ties, presumably having comparable needs, which fail to
spend more than a very small per capita sum for police
protection.
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9Tables 18 and 19 present comparative statistics on
the costs and case loads of two of the welfare programs
administered and in large part financed by the 30 cities
and towns. The average monthly case load per 1,000 popula-
tion gives a good relative indication of the need which
the various municipalities are called upon to meet, for
while it is true that these ratios are less than represen-
tative of absolute need, since some municipalities may be
more lenient and accomodating in the acceptance -of cases
than others, the partial state supe rvision of both programs
tends to minimize such differences in the administrative
standards of the various municipalities.
The need'lfor general relief, which includes all muni-
cipal aid falling outside of the "category" relief programs,
is obviously closely related to economic conditions, since
poverty and destitution will be more prevalent in times of
depression; the aid to dependent children program is, on
the other hand, little affected by economic conditions since
cases falling in this category are the outcome of family
1
rather than financial misfortunes. It is notable, however,
that the monthly case load per 1,000 population for both
assistance programs is Jargest in the densely populated
(1) See Appendix B for definition of "dependent child".
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TABLE 18
AVERAGE EXPENDITURES FOR GENERAL RELIEF
AVERAGE CASE LOADS : 1940-1941( 30 CITIES AND TOWNS )
Average Expenditure
Per Cap Per Case
Average Monthly Case
Load/1,000 Pop
Revere
Chelsea
Everett
Cambridge
Malden
Medford
Boston
Lynn
Lexington
Dedham
Somerville
Brookline
Watertown
Braintree
Weymouth
MEDIAN
Newton
Waltham
Stoneham
Woburn
Melrose
Wakefield
Arlington
Winthrop
Quincy
Belmont
Needham
Saugus
Wellesley
/Idlton
Winchester
$8.95
8.74
8.09
7.23
6*05
5.58
5.56
5.38
5.01
4,96
4-.62
4.38
4.12'
3065
3.49
3.28
3.07
2.80
2.48
2.23
2.08
1.98
1074
1062
1061
1051
1.32
1.07
1.06
0.76
0.68
$29.55
29.30
33.30
37.15
34.30
41.50
26.40
26.25
35.40
31.40
38.00
42.35
40.90
-41.05
32.20
37.90
42.35
30.40
47.95
30.60
32.75
32.95
28.70
33.25
34.45
33.80
21.20
34.45
40.65
31.30
8oUrce: See Appendix B
12f
25.6
24*2
20.4
17*9
1407
11.4
17.5
17.2
11.8
13,2
9.8
8.6
8.3
7.4
9.1
6.7
5,6
6.9
4.1
5.8
5.1
4.4
4.8
4.0
3.6
3.3
4.3
2.6
1.7
1.8
industrial cities which have a low per capita wealth. Of
the 7 municipalities with the highest general relief case
load ratios, 5 had densities of over 10,000 persons per
square mile and all lost population in the decade 1930-1940;
4 of these same cities also show the highest relative case
loads in the aid to dependent children program. In strik-
ing contrast to the high ratios of the thickly populated
central cities are the low figures prevailing in the subur-
ban cities and towns. Belmont, Needham, Saugus, Wellesley,
Milton and Winchester all have average monthly case load
ratios for general relief of under 4 per 1,000 population;
the figure for Revere is 25.6; Wellesley, Belmont, Winchester
and Winthrop have case load ratios in the aid to dependent
children program of under 1, while Boston shows a figure of
5.40 and in Everett the ratio is 3.98.
per capita expenditure for both programs, of course,
varies widely and in direct relationship to the case load;
although the suburban towns of Weymouth and Woburn both have
high per capita expenditures in the aid to dependent children
category, the thickly settled industrial cities usually spend
considerably more per capita than the residential communi-
ties; the general relief expenditures present an even clearer
instance of this pattern, for the 7 cities with the highest
per capita expenditure are all thickly settled centers in most
of which there is considerable industry.
13P
TABLE 19
AVERAGE EXPENDITURE FOR AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN
AND AVERAGE CASE LOADS : 1940-1941
30 CITIES AND TOWNS )
Average Expenditure Average Monthly Case
Per Cap Per Case Load/1,000 Pop
Boston $4.03 $62.25 5.40
Everett 2.70 56.50 3,98
Cambridge 2.65 61.45 3.32
Chelsea 2.46 55.15 4.02
Woburn 2.45 63.45 3.22
Watertovn 2.36 71.20 2.77
Weymouth 2.28 64.20 2.98
Revere 2.11 50.70 3.46
Somerville 1.64 63.80 2.14
Newton 1*&0 60.80 2.21
Malden 1.51 54.30 2.31.
Waltham 1.47 60.90 2.01
Lexington 1.41 62.45 1.87
Lynn 1.41 57.10 2.05
Quincy 1.28 55.60 1.92
MEDIAN 1.27
Brookline 1.26 63.80 1.64
Medford 1.23 58.00 1.77
Arlington 1.22 69.60 1,46
Braintree 1.21 58.20 2.45
Stoneham 1.12 61.00 1.54
Wakefield 1.08 50.95 1.76
Dedham 1.07 57.65 1.55
Melrose 0.96 60.25 1.32
Needham 0.96 65.75 1.20
Milton 0.89 71.30 1.04
Wellesley 0.76 6070 053
Belmont 0.52 58.75 0.*73
Winchester 0.52 58.45 0.77
Saugus 0.48 38.30 1.05
Winthrop 0.30 59.45 0.42
80 Urce: See Appendix B
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The column tabulating expenditure per case is of
interest chiefly in showing that federal participation
in the aid to dependent children program achieves a degree
of equalization of payments. Excluding Saugus with its
exceptionally low payment of but $38.30 per case in the
case of dependent child category, the largest per case
expenditure of $71.30 in Milton is only 40% greater than
the smallest per case expenditure of $50.70 in Revere;
for the general relief program, however, the maximum per
case expenditure is 125% greater than the smallest, while
even the exclusion of the top and bottom figures, still
leaves a high expenditure which is 65% larger than the low.
In general, the municipalities with the heaviest case loads
are unable despite their greater per capita expenditures to
equal the per case expenditures made in the cities and towns
with a light case load, However, it seems unnecessary to
labor further the obvious point that in the poorer towns
there is both a greater social need and a smaller financial
ability to furnish the assistance programs.
10
Table 20 represents a frankly unsuccessful attempt to
establish some correlation between health service expendi-
tures and several rates which are considered to indicate the
extent and effectiveness of health service activities. Total
and infant death rates, notably the latter, suggest the
13P
effectiveness of the prevention of disease, while the annual
ratio of new tuberculosis cases to deaths and the number
of new venereal disease cases reported per 100,000 popula-
tion are two among a number of ratios considered indicative
of the effectiveness of the discovery of disease, the Ameri-
can Public Health Association Appraisal.,Form suggesting that
ratios falling below 2 and 600 respectively indicate in-
1
sufficient or ineffective work in this field. The cure
or disease, of course, represents a health service's third
major function, but since no trustworthy statistical in-
formation is available on this subject, it has not been
possible to develop any indices which might suggest need
in this field.
Few generalizations are possible on the basis of the
figures presented in this table; Revere and Dedham have the
identicalKl total death rate of 10.5, while in such con-
trasting municipalities as Lynn and Winthrop the figure is
13.1 and 13.0 respectively; owing to its unusual population
composition, Brookline has the highest overall death rate
of any of the 30 cities and towns, but on the other hand,
it has a low infant death rate. In general, both total and
infant death rates appear to be somewhat lower in the
wealthier suburbs, such as Wellesley, Newton, Milton and
Lexington; Stoneham and Arlington, however, which both fall
below the median per capita assessed valuation figure of
(1) See American Public Health Association: Committee on Ad-
ministrative Practice: Appraisal Form for City Public
Health Work (4th ed.) 1934; and Evaluation Schedule, c. 1943.
TABLE 20
AVERAGE EIPENDITURES FOR HEALTH SERVICES
AND SELECTED AVERAGE VITAL STATISTICS : 1940-1941
( 30 CITIES AND TOWNS )
Average
Expenditures
Per Cap
Death Rates TB Cases
Total Infant Reported
Per Death
VD Cases
Reported
/100,000
Brookline
Boston
Cambridge
Lynn
Wellesley
Winchester
Belmont
Saugus
Newton
Lexington
Braintree
Dedham
Quincy
Stoneham
Somerville
NEDIAN
Waltham
Needham
Weymouth
Malden
Watertown
Everett
Medford
Milton
Wakefield
Arlington
Chelsea
Melrose
Woburn
Revere,
Winthrop
SOurce: See Appendix B
(1): Infant mortality'rates are published
and towns of 15,000 and over.
in PD 2 only for cities
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$2.45
2.36
2*07
2.05
2 *01
1094
1.93
1.82
1.74
1.71
1.67
1.67
1.62
1.61
1.57
1.57
1.56
1.55
1050
1.48
1.48
1.43
1.40
1037
1.29
1.26
1.14
1,12
1.11
1005
0098
13,3
12.9
12.2
13.1
8.4
8.7
8.6
10.6
1009
9.0
10.2
10.5
9.8
9.1
10.9
10.3
10.1
11.4
1108
9.7
1002
9.9
10.2
10.7
10.5
10.6
10,6
1101
1005
13.0
24.0
40.2
3709
3705
20.0
42.6
30.3
(1)
24.4
(1)
29.9
24* 8
31.2
(1)
32.2
28.9
(1)
27.3
37.1
19.8
29.7
29.6
24,1
29.3
31.2
31.9
16.0
2806
45.7
22.1
3.05
2.00
2.00
1078
2050
1.90
2050
3013
1.21
8.50
5.00
1.20
2.47
4.84
1065
4021
1.70
4.36
2.10
2034
1.73
2.70
2.25
2.30
2,57
1.54
1.80
0.69
1.63
1.17
150
388
268
199
116
100
84
108
141
80
150
74
134
100
162
161
92
115
185
164
207
139
101
117
78
206
111
122
217
135
$1,526, have low total death rates, while Meirose, with a
per capita assessed valuation of $1,521, has the lowest
infant death rate of any of the 30 cities and towns.
Although the per capita expenditure figures repeat
the familiar pattern of 3arger sums disbursed in the
wealthier towns, there is no observable correlation between
the per capita expense and any of the rates presented; some
of the municipalities with the smallest per capita expen-
diture have relatively high ratios of tuberculosis cases
discovered per death; Melrose with the 4th lowest expendi-
ture per capita has the lowest infant death rate and one of
the smaller total death rates, while Boston, on the other
hand, with the 2nd highest per capita expenditure, has a
high death rate, the highest infant death rate and only a
mediocre 2 as the ratio of tuberculosis cases to deaths.
One severe limitation of the figures here presented is that
they include only the cost of municipal health services
and overlook the expense of those provided by private agen-
cies; in addition "mortality rates are influenced by many
factors, the economic, industrial, cultural, and educational
status and the nativity stock of the inhabitants; the age
distribution of the population; the geographical location,
and climactic environment; as well as the actual community
1
measures that are carried out to conserve health."
(1) American Public Health Association: Appraisal Form, opcit.
Pp. 1-2.
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For these reasons, it is virtually impossible to detect
correlation between mortality rates and the per capita
expenditures for health purposes,
11
It is obvious that evaluation must become increasingly
tentative and conjectural as the objectives of the functions
under consideration become more intricate. Road maintenance,
street cleaning and even fire fighting are services with
precise and simple aims, and the two assistance programs con-
sidered have objectives which are only slightly more complex;
as a consequence, the comparative evaluation of these func-
tions was able to reach certain conclusions relative to need
and performance in the 30 municipalities of the Inner Metro-
politan District. Police protection, recreational programs
and health service, by contrast, have such numerous and com-
plex aims that the evaluation attempted in earlier secticns
was relatively inconclusive. With the consideration of edu-
cation, we reach a function whose objectives despite a decep-
tive simplicity, have a basic complexity and subtlety that
makes evaluation extremely difficult; in the words of a New
York State Legislative Commission "Education cannot be measured
directly through expenditures, teachers' salaries, per pupil
costs, holding power, examination marks, graduations, books
read or chair warming hours, because it takes place in the
life and character of the children and adults who come under
TABLE 21
AVERAGE OPERATING EXPENDITURES
AVERAGE ENROLLMENT RATIOS AND AVERAGE PER PUPIL
VALUATIONS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS : 1940-1941
( 30 CITIES AND TOWNS )
Average Expenditure
Per Cap Per Pupil
Newton
Wellesley
Dedham
Milton
Braintree
Revere
Brookline
Lexington
Belmont
Boston
Needham
Winchester
Weymouth
Wakefield
Cambridge
$21.70
21.50
20.60
20.50
20.30
19.90
19.70
19*70
19*30
19.30
19.10
18.80
17.90
17.30
16.50
MEDIAN 16.40
Arlington
Everett
Watertown
Medford
Saugus
Melrose
Quincy
Winthrop
Chelsea
Stoneham
Somerville
Waltham
Lynn
Woburn
Malden
16.30
16.30
16.20
16.10
16.00
15.50
15,40
15030
15.10
15.00
14.80
14.80
14.60
13070
13.50
$133.43
121.87
117.61
118.72
92,04
108.34
151.71
99.49
112.89
134.69
-105.69
115.72
9Q.73
103.73
133.38
101.38
100.82
92.49
92.65
100.01
77.61
101.68
96,13
82,84
101.07
102.14
99.68
99.52
108.91
82.99
98.20
PS Pupils Assessed Value of
/100 Pop Value School
16.3
17.7
17.5
17.3
22.0
18.4
13.0
19.8
17.1
14.3
18.1
16.3
19.7
16.7
12.3
16.2
17.7
17.4
16.1
20.6
1503
16.0
18.4
15.0
14.8
14.8
15,0
13.4
16.6
13.7
Per Pupil
$14,824
16,360
9,127
12,331
7,103
6,291
23,381
9,827
11,414
13,413
10,468
13,609
10,981
7,765
12,442
9,040
8,649
8,304
7,912
5,172
9,692
9,878
7,907
7,138
9,402
7,502
8,714
9,938
6,160
8,674
Property
Per Pupil
$850
729
626
729
465
889
685
579
503
676
562
683
561
557
492
456
530
448
526
316
622
535
407
455
353
304
431
724
540
624
Source: See Appendix B
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its influence."
Despite the difficulties of measurement, it is possible
to draw certain conclusions and inferences from the figures
given in Table 21. The variation in the number of public
school pupils per 100 population shows that owing to the age,
religious and social composition of their populations, cer-
tain municipalities have a re~atively small number of chil-
dren for whom free education must be provided; in the two
years 1940 and 1941, Cambridge, for instance, had an average
of only 12.3 public school pupils for each 100 persons in
the general population, while Braintree had 22.0. The per-
centage of the general population attending public schools
is, on the whole, larger in the suburban towns than in the
more central cities; there are, however, obvious exceptions
to this statement, for in Revere the percentage reaches
the fairly high figure of 18.4, while in Brookline the age
composition of the population keeps the figure as low as 13.0.
There is thus a small though important variation in
the demands made on the different municipalities to provide
free education. For the reasons noted in the quotation cited
above, it is impossible to present any proof of similar varia-
tions in the adequacy of the education provided; however, where
(1) New York: Special Joint Committee on Taxation and Retrench-
ment: Fiscal Problems of City School Administration, 1928,
pp. 69-70. Quoted from Ridley and Simon: Measuring Muni-
cipal Activities, pp. 41-2.
there is a wide difference in the annual per pupil expenditure
or in the value of school plant per pupil there is presump-
tive grounds for assuming correlated divergence in the quan-
tity or quality of the education offered. With some conspic-
uous exceptions, including Cambridge and Boston, the densely
populated inner cities and the poorer suburbs spend consid-
erably leas per pupil than such wealthy residential towns
as Newton, Wellesley, Dedham, Brookline, Winchester and Bel-
mont. Everett's per pupil expenditure, for instance, is
$92.49 and that of Somerville is $99.68, while Dedham and
Milton each spend about $118 for every pupil in their public
schools; in Woburn the per pupil expenditure is but $82.99,
while in Saugus the per pupil figure of $77.61 is only slightly
more than half the sum expended on a similar basis in Brookline.
Despite the high figures prevailing in Revere and Lynn, the
value of school property per pupil also gives presumptive evi-
dence of a higher educational level in the wealthier communi-
ties.
Although several municipalities with a low ratio of
public school pupils to general population are able to provide
a large per pupil expenditure at relatively low per capita cost,
there is in general close oorrelatt a between the two expendi-
ture ratios; of the 9 municipalities with the highest per pupil
expenditure, 6 are also included in the group of 9 localities
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whose per capita expenditures are highest. Although there
are notable exceptions, for instance Revere, which has a
high figure in both categories, large per pupil and per
capita expenditures are usually associated with high per
capita assessed valuations; of the 15 municipalities dis-
bursing more per capita than the median of $16.40 only 2
have a lower than median assessed valuation per capita.
In general, however, these same cities and towns possess
fairly high pupil ratios which explain at least in part the
large per capita figures. Nonetheless, it remains true
that a number of poorer municipalities, for example Win-
throp, Woburn and Watertown, whose need as indicated by
pupil ratios is also high, spend very small sums on both a
per capita and a per pupil basis. In the light of the fig-
ures in this table, it seems probable, in fact, that educa-
tion represents another example of a service in which expen-
diture, and inferentially performance, is more responsive
to the community's wealth than to its needs.
12
Although the fragmentary statistical analyses contained
in the preceding pages have reached no startling conclusions
and in several instances have failed of any conclusions, they
have the limited value of illustrating and emphasizing in
terms of a specific metropolitan district a few of the problems
1v0
that are of concern to metropolitan districts throughout
the country. Stated in the baldest terms, the principal
problem stressed by the figures of this chapter is the
failure of need for a service to coincide with the ability
to provide it. Although their per capita tax bases are by
no means equal, there is no corresponding adjustment in
the demands made upon the governments of the 30 cities and
towns in the metropolitan district; although it finds it
harder to pay the bill, Woburn needs police protection just
as much as Wellesley, and although it cannot finance it as
easily, Malden has as much need for public education as
Weymouth. In many instances, notably the provision of the
assistance programs, need aven increases as financial ability
disappears, and as a consequence the poorest cities, for
example Chelsea or Revere, are saddled with an obligation
they can fulfill only at the severest financial sacrifice.
-As a result of their inadequate tax bases the poorer
municipalities are forced either to impose an unduly heavy
burden upon their taxpayers or to deny their residents the
level of service they deserve, both of which courses carry
dangers to the district's individual municipalities, rich
and poor, as well as to the district as a whole. Either an
unduly heavy tax burden or an inadequate service level will
cause a gradual depopulation which will so erode an already
141
insubstantial tax base that the individual city is threatened
with a collapse that places an added burden upon the surviv-
ing municipalities. And in addition to this ultimate danger,
an inadequate service level in one municipality threatens
the effectiveness of its neighbor's expenditures; earlier
pages have already sufficiently stressed that the poor
health service or the lax police protection of one municipal-
ity can jeopardize the safety and the health of the entire
metropolitan district. The wealthy community cannot afford
to ignore the plight of its poorer neighbor for its own
prosperity and that of the district depend upon the prosperity
of each unit in the entire metropolitan region.
14?
CHAPTER X
A recent article in the National Municipal Review
outlines the major problem of the metropolitan district in
a clear and forceful fashion: "The well-to-do residents
of some of the numerous small tax districts in the subur-
ban areas, a few of them little larger than postage stamps,
have for the time being successfully insulated themselves
against political upheavals and costs of local government
... iTwo major questions remain. Can they insulate them-
selves also against progressive economic decay in the central
city on whose economic adequacy their own survival depends?
If not, what new governmental mechanisms are necessary to
permit reharnessing for. common purposes the political,
economic and administrative capacities of all those insep-
1
arable parts of one economic urban unit."
Only long years of discussion and experiment by voters
and officeholders can be expected to provide any answer to
the critical question of the character of the governmental
reorganization which is needed to resolve the problems of
the metropolitan district. This chapter will not presume
to present a detailed scheme of metropolitan government,
(1) Cornick Philip H.: "New Exodus to Suburbs Near",
NMR 35: , Jan. 1946
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but will content itself with the more modest but still
formidable task of outlining certain broad principles
upon which such schemes may well be founded.
2
In the face of the gravity of the problems confront-
ing the metropolitan districts of this country, it is
unrealistic and ingenuous to anticipate any lasting im-
provement from the half measures that have so frequently
failed in the past; the creation of additional governmental
units and the constant petty modification of their relation-
ships are simply not adequate substitutes for the sweeping
governmental reorganization which alone bears the answer
to the metropolitan district's problems.
In many of our metropolitan districts, attempts have
been made to mitigate or eliminate some of these problems
by the use of intergovernmental contracts which reduce the
number of competing jurisdictions and .permit the establish-
ment of larger and more satisfactory operational units;
in this country the technique has been most extensively
and effectively used in the Los Angeles metropolitan area
where at their request the county furnishes the municipali-
ties with a wide variety of services, ranging from tax
collection to health inspection. "Some two hundred inter-
governmental contracts are currently in effect in the area.
They deal with every major function of local government
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except police, purchasing and public welfare administration;
there is active coo8peration among local units in the two
former functions, and the county government has exclusive
jurisdiction over public welfare administration." In
other parts of the country there has been a similar though
less widespread use of the intergovernmental contract:
Chicago, for instance provides water service not only for
over 3 million Chicagoans but for an additional 300,000 sub-
urbanites living in 52 surrounding cities and villages, and
Cincinnati; a city of less than half a million, serves2
80,000 suburban residents in the same way. However, though
the intergovernmental contract has the indubitable advan-
tage of replacing many small and impoverished departments by
a single agency which can afford the specialized equipment
and personnel needed to secure a high level of service, it
obviously works no improvement of the confused governmental
structure and thus has little or no value, in encouraging
citizen interest or in improving responsibility and control.
Since it often reduces both cost and waste, the intergovern-
mental contract is a step in the right direction; it is, how-
ever, only one halting step, for instead of attacking the gov-
ernmental confusion which is at the root of metropolitan
(1) Stewart and Ketcham: "Intergovernmental Contracts in
California", PAR 1:244 Spring 1941. See also Jamison
Judith Norvell:~"Neighboring Areas Join Hands", NMR 3
111-14, March 1946.
(2) Lepawsky: Development of Urban Government, p. 34.
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problems, the contract accepts its existence and attempts
only to mitigate its effects,
Ano.ther measure sometimes employed to alleviate the
problems of the metropolitan district is the centralization
under state auspices of functions the district's independent
units are unable to provide in a satisfactory fashion.
Under the fundamentally different conditions prevailing in
impoverished rural areas, this device has been used in
several southern states to relieve counties and municipali-
ties of a portion or even all of the responsibility for the
1
provision of education and the construction of roads; in
Pennsylvania, the designation as State highways of consider-
able road mileage within metropolitan districts has at least
laid the basis for a partially coordinated highway policy
2
within these areas; and in several instances, the various
states have assured a uniform level of public assistance
within their areas by assuming the entire cost of the aid
programs. Although most of these instances of centraliza-
tion have arisen from the financial inability of the local
units to maintain even minimum service, the principle is
obviai sly capable of application to metropolitan districts
with the aim of obtaining a coordination and efficiency for
which the small, independent units furnish no basis; such
:1) See Wager Paul W.: "State Centralization in the South"
Annals 201: 144-50, June 1940.
:2) Alderfer H. F.: Centralization in Pennsylvania, NMR_
27:189-166, April 1938.
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an approach has, in fact, motivated the state assumption
of authority represented by such a body as the Boston
Metropolitan District Commission. Whatever its advantages,
the diminution of local control arising from state encroach-
ment is sufficient to warrant the rejection of the device
in. all but the most exceptionable cases.
The larger and more important special districts, usually
known as authorities, which have multiplied within our met-
ropolitan districts over the past fifty years are often
merely agencies of state centralization and are for that
reason somewhat repugnant to principles of local government.
This defect of such a typical authority as the Metropolitan
District Commission was analyzed in these terms by a recent
legislative commission: "The Metropolitan District Commission
is a state organization, under strict legislative direction,
dealing with matters chiefly of interest to a certain metro-
politan area hat constitutes but a small fraction of the
area of the State. While the communities included in the
metropolitan district are assessed for most of the improve-
ments made, and for the operation and maintenance work car-
ried on by the Commission, these municipalities have no
direct voice in the determination of the policies and ex-
penditures of their metropolitan authority. Obviously this
situation is open to criticism as a governmental policy, since
it amounts to taxation without adequate representation."
A consequence of this lack of local control over such
state-administered authorities is public apathy toward their
operations; in the Boston area, metropolitan government has
made no significant advances since the 1895 creation of the
Metropolitan Water District, owing at least in part to the
stiffling by state control of local interest in the agencies
which might have been developed into an effective metropoli-
tan government; writing of the grandfather of all centrally
controlled authorities, W. A. Robson notes that "The real
cause of the rottenness of the Board" (The London Metropoli-
tan Board of Works) "lay deeper than the rapacity of offi-
cials and contractors. The fundamental defect of the Metro-
politan Board of Works was that it completely failed to
awaken any civic spirit in the minds of London inhabitants.
The proceedings of the Board evoked neither interest nor
2
enthusiasm."
Even when authorities and special districts are subject
to local ,bontrol, as is the case with their most numerous
representatives, the school district, .special districts
augment rathern.than decrease the metropolitan district's
number of political units and its consequent organizational
(1) Mass: Special Commission on Taxation And Public Expendi-
ture: Report Part XIII, The Metropolitan District Commis-
sion, House #1713, 19383~P. 24.
(2) Robson: The Government and Misgovernment of London, P. 65.
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ohaos. Although they are often required by the governmental
paralysis which seizes our metropolitan areas, the special
districts and authorities are at best necessary evils:
they bring the metropolitan area useful and even vital ser-
vices, but only at the price of increasing an already dis-
astrous governmental confusion.
The measures that have been discussed in the preceding
paragraphs are only palliatives and quack remedies that are
unable to reach to the seat of the metropolitan district's
disease. More radical measures are, however, frequently
killed by the varieties of selfishness and inertia consid-
ered in an earlier chapter. Both annexation and consolida-
tion, which frequently involves incidental annexation, are
usually vigorously opposed by the minor party to the proposed
merger; Allegheny City decried so bitterly its forcible con-
1
solidation by Pittsburg in 1907 that in this country subse-
quent enlargements of the central city's area have not been
consummated without the expressed approval of the district
to be absorbed. Yet even where the municipality is willing,
its county is certain to object, if the annexation would
transfer the territory to the jurisdiction of another
county; thus in 1854 Middlesex County officially objected
to the proposed annexation of Charlestown by Boston, and
(1) Studenski: The Government of Metropolitan Areas in the
United States, P. 80 ff.
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selectmen from certain Norfolk County towns protested the
1
1868 annexation of Roxbury. In the face of the strong
opposition offered both by the suburbs and the county, it
is not surprising that annexation and consolidation have
failed in recent years to offer a practical resolution of
the metropolitan district's governmental problems. Many
of the central cities in our major metropolitan districts
have failed to make any significant changes in their
boundaries for almost one hundred years; Philadelphia, for
instance, is today only 0.1 square mile.-larger than after
the consolidation and annexation of 1854; San Francisco
is the same size as in 1856 and St. Louis has not grown in
2
area since 1876, while since 1880 Boston has added only
3
5 square miles, of which 20% is the product of filling.
Despite the examples of certain cities, notably Los Ange-
les and Detroit which both added considerably to their
area during the 1920's, annexation4has in recent years failed
to match the scale of the decentralization and population
growth which have so increased the size of the metropolitan
districts; during the decade 1930-1940, the largest annexa-
tion to a central city only added a municipality of some
4
4,000 inhabitants to the City of San Jose. As a method of
1 Jones: Metropolitan Government, P. 300.
2 Lepawaky: ,o. cit., P. 33.
Jones: Op. cit., P. 126.
Jones: op. cit., P. 126.
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governmental simplification within the metropolitan dis-
trict, consolidaticn is equally moribund; this country's
last major county-city reorganization (technically a case
of "separation" rather than consolidation) was the Denver-
Arapahoe County measure of 1903, and since that time city-
county consolidation proposals have between defeated by
local referendum in all parts of the country from Portland,2
Oregon (1927) to Pittsburg (1929).
In view of the undesirability and the impracticality
of the other measures already discussed, federation offers
the most likely solution to the governmental disorganization
of the metropolitan districts. Although, it creates the
vexatious problems, which proved so troublesome to our own
national government, of securing a satisfactory allocation
of authority and function among the federated units, it offers
the advantage of retaining at least in name most or all of
the existing municipalities of the metropolitan area and
thus forestalling some of the suburban opposition which has
been so effective in wrecking other reorganizational propo-
sals. Since it possesses this hypothetical advantage, it may
seem curious that instances of accomplished federation are
even rarer than examples of consolidation or annexation; the
1898 measure which united 5 boroughs into New York City left
the former with such vestigial authority that it is more
(1) See Fesler, Mayo: "Denver Consolidation A Shining Light"
in National Municipal League, City Growing Pains, PP. 44-h.
(2) Reed Thomas H.: "The Metropolitan Problem 141", in
City 4 rowing Pains, P. 9.
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properly considered an example of consolidation than of
1
federation; similarly Berlin's 20 administrative dis-
triots fail to form a federal structure since exclusive
2
financial authority rests with the central body. In
fact, the only modern example of the use of federation
to help solve the governmental problems of the metropoli-
tan district is furnished by the County Council and the
28 metropolitan boroughs of the London area. The rarity
of its use is explained, howevei, by federation's fundamen-
tally radical approach to the problems presented by the
metropolitan district; intergovernmental contracts and
the creation of special districts are tangential approaches
to a few of these difficulties, while consolidation and an-
nexation represent efforts to compass their solution in
terms of devices which proved effective in the past. Fed-
eration, on the other hand, recognizing both the full range
and the novelty of the problems, offers a basic reorganiza-
tion that might succeed where inadequate and outdated meas-
ures have previously failed. Sweeping away both the counties
and the special districts, federation replaces the metropoli-
tan district's present governmental confusion with a simple
and logical structure that offers the advantages of unified
(1) Jones: o .cit., P.44 ff. Studenski: of_.cit., ch. XVII;
Regional7P1~E of New York and Its Environs; Regional
Survey, Vol. II: Government, Ch. VI, etc.
(2) See Jones, o.cit., P. 39 ff.
1 5
agriculture, may, if necessary, be developed at a later date
in respcnse to the district's population growth.
To achieve this ideal, will in many cases require bounda-
ries enclosing a huge extent of territory with widely differ-
ing needs; it is not, however, proposed that the metropolitan
government emulate the earlier example of some municipalities
which attempts to provide their entire area with a level of
service warranted only in the densely settled districts. Dur-
ing the early years of this century, at a time when each
decade saw the addition of considerable undeveloped acreage
to Chicago's total area, Mayor Harrison warned: "Chicago's
territory is today too great, ... An attempt to increase this
territory should meet with emphatic discouragement. The
ideal city is compact. With its area fully occupied the care
of all branches of administration can be applied to all sec-
tions expeditiously and well." The metropolitan government,
however, would not claim to apply all branches of adminis-
tration to all sections, but would instead, through the
creation of functional sub-areas within the district, dis-
tribute service and expense in proportion to need and resources;
the functional area of the metropolitan government's recreational
department, for example, would cover the entire metropolitan
administrative area, while the water department, on the other
1. Quoted Studenski: op.cit., P. 155. No source given.
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hand, would ope rate over a smaller inner territory where
demand was sufficient to justify the provision of the service.
Under this scheme, which is considered at more length in
subsequent pages, the metropolitan government would escape
the fate of numerous cities which, in their endeavor to
preserve the pretense of uniform service throughout their
entire area, sunk all their resources in material improvements
that vast extents of sparsely settled land could neither
pay for nor maintain. The use of functional areas within
the metropolitan district would secure uniform service for
uniform need, but would avoid the prohibitive expense of
spreading an urban level of service over its entire area.
4
In an earlier chapter a distinction was made between
three types of function performed by local government: "pro-
tective"' functions, including the work of the fire, police,
health and inspectional departmentsare negative in that
they have as their objective the prevention of undesirable
conditions, while the "social" functions, of which educa-
tional, recreational and welfare activities present the
principal examples, are -positive in that they attempt to
create healthier, happier and wiser citizens; the utility
functions, which include sewerage, street cleaning, garbage
collection, t'oad construction and water supply, occupy a
neutral midposition since their concern is more with
physical services than with the civic and moral values
that are so prominent in conditioning the objectives of
the other two types of function. A further difference
between the protective and "social" functions, on the one
hand, and the "utility" on the other arises from the nature
of the needs they fill: The need for the latter functions
is in general relative and becomes more pressing as density
increases; street cleaning or a sewerage system are unnec-
essary or are luxuries in sparsely settled areas and become
indispensable only when high population creates distinctive
urban problems. In contrast, though its quantitative amount
will vary, the need -for the other two functions is absolute,
for education or protection are just as necessary to the
farm lad as to the city boy.
These distinctions are helpful in guiding the allocation
of functions among the central authority and the subordinate
local units. Since the need for the "utility" functions
varies with the density and local-conditions of different
areas, these functions can logically be provided either by
the local units or by the functional sub-areas of the central
government. However, though the latter can reasonably omit
low density areas where the relative cost would be prohibi-
tive and provide a sewerage system, as an example, for only a
portion of the district, it cannot so restrict the scope of
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the preventive and social functions; the metropolitan gov-
ernment would, of course, be completely unjusftified in
concluding that its sparse population made free/ducation
unnecessny in the district's outlying areas. These con-
siderations indicate that the central government must pro-
vide uniform service where it assumes preventive or social
functions and, in addition, should encourage its attainment
in those cases where the ultimate responsibility remains
with the local units. Utility functions can in many cases
be left entirely to the smaller unit s, or where greater cen-
tralization is desired, planning and supervision can be con-
centrated in the metropolitan government while still reserv-
ing construction and operations to the local governments.
In general, a function should be transferred to the cen-
tral metropolitan government only when it will prcmote greater
efficiency, a more uniform level of service or a more equit-
able distribution of the financial burden. Since some func-
tions, for example smoke prevention, must include virtually
all of an urbanized area to attain even minimal results and
efficiency, their planning and supervision might well be
vested in the central authority, with operational duties
remaining a local responsibility, save where local indolence
or incompetence warrants intervention by the higher govern-
ment. In other cases, efficiency is greatly promoted if the
latter provides not only coordination and planning, but also
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a portion of the plant; since both sewerage and water sys-
tems are obvious examples of services which the small inde-
pendent units can supply, if at all, only at the cost of
duplication of equipment and inferiority of results, they
clearly invite the central government to provide the major
facilities around which the local systems can be organized.
However, the claims of efficiency in dictating the metro-
politan assumption of a function should not be pressed too
far: government is after all organized for people and only
secondarily for efficiency, and thus the quest for economy
and concrete achievement should not be pursued at the sa ri-
fice of less tangible social values. "The desires and tra-
dition of local citizens must have adequate expression,
and this may involve acceptance of something less than the.
economic first choice in the process of reorganization.,
The creation of a more uniform service level by the
transfer of a function to the central government frequently
is rewarded by a greater efficiency which justifies the re-
allocation; the police and health departments of independent
municipalities are, for instance, hampered in their work and
all the residents of the district exposed to danger by the
marked inequalities in service performance that often arise
where the control of these functions is widely divided. On
the other hand uniform performance, without any reference to
(1) Council of State Governments: State Local Relations, Pp.
202-3.
consequent efficiency, may be a sufficient justification
for central administratica of certain functions which
have a "metropolitant interest. Thus if the national
interest demands as an ideal a uniform minimum level of
free education throughout the country, how much more im-
mediate and obvious, in view of its unity and internal
mobility, is the metropolitan district's stake in a mini-
mum standard of educational achievement within its own
area. And where there is a metropolitan interest, as in
the case of education, and less clearly in the instances of
the health, welfare and recreational functions, it is only
just that there should also be a metropolitan, rather than
a merely local, financial responsibility.
These criteria - efficiency, uniform service and equit-
able financial responsibility, which are suggested as guides
in allocating functions to the central government, suggest
that such a unit might first be given control over a number
of the utility functions. Since it is in this sphere that
the need for coordination is most obvious, though not always
greatest, and since some progress has already been made by
the special districts toward its attainment, it is likely
that such an initial step would not arouse invincible
opposition. As a second stage, after it had consolidated its
control over certain "utility" functions, of which main
water and sewerage systems, arterial road networks, airfield
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and port facilities are the most important, the central
government could gradually extend its influence into more
controversial fields and assume complete or partial respon-
sibility for the provision of certain preventive and social
functions, including, in all likelihood, dolice, fire,
health, education and recreation.
In any case, local control should receive instinctive
preference and the burden of proof that centralization
would best serve the district should be placed upon the
central metropolitan government. Even where it was unargu-
able that metropolitan control was necessary, administration
of centrally determined policies and projects should, when
feasible, remain with the local governmental- units. In
conclusion, and as a warning against the excesses of
rational but insensitive reduction of local functions, it is
pertinent to quote the remarks of the Presidentts Committee
on Administrative Management that "Government is a human
institution .... The reorganization of government is not a
mechanical task. It is a human task and must be approached
as a problem of morale and personnel fully as much as a task
of logic and management."
(1) Quoted White, L. D.: Introduction to the Study of Public
Administration, P. 109, from President's Committee on
Administrative Management: Report with Special Studies,
P. 38.
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5Fragmentary data based on insufficient experience indi-
cates that governmental reorganization, especially where it
has involved a significant expansion of central city bounda-
ries is likely to cause a considerable rise in governmental
expense. It is true that the Philadelphia consolidation of
1854, which was largely inspired by a reform movement agita-
tion for greater efficiency and economy, resulted in a tem-
porary retrenchment, while the 1876 boundary expansion in
St. Louis was accompanied by the writing of a new charter
limiting the city tax rate to 1% and thus forcing stringent
economy measures. In New York, on the other hand, available
evidence shows that the 1898 consolidation created a higher
and more uniform level of service throughout the entire area
by placing a considerably heavier burden upca the residents
of Manhattan; in 1899 Comptroller Coller estimated that the
borough of Manhattan cm tributed a total of 6 million dollars
toward the cost of improvements and operations in the other
2
4 boroughs; as a consequence, the Brooklyn tax rate for 1899
(1) Studenski: op.cit., P. 144 ff.
(2) For fuller discussion of the fiscal effect of the New
York consolidation see: Jones, om.Oi. P. 199 ff.
Studenski, op.cit, P. 141 ff; Regional Plan of New York;
op~ci., P. 264 ff. from which sources data here presented
is derived.
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was the lowest in 17 years and represented a net levy re-
duction of some $1,680,000. over the previous year. An
analysis of the consolidated city's expenditures over the
decade 1898-1908 suggests that the extension and improve-
ment of utilities created a considerable portion of the in-
creased expenditures; of the new bonds issued during this
decade, which saw debt service expenditures rise 189%, 25%
were issues for street and water purposes, 18% for water
supply and 28% for the construction of docks, bridges and
rapid transit facilities. Viewing a budget rise of from
$78,400,000. in 1898 to a figure of $103,400,000. in 1907,
there was considerable outcry that the consolidation was
leading the city to bankruptcy. Comptroller Coller warned
in 1899 that "The form of government applicable to thickly
settled urban communities is essentially inapplicable to
suburban localities and is correspondingly wasteful. I
fear that in this respect, at least, the charter has im-
posed upon our taxpayers an unnecessary burden which may
perhaps bring about advantages in the future but scarcely
1
to a compensating degree." Hindsight, however, shows
that this prognostication was unnecessarily pessimistic,
for while it is likely that in the years immediately follow-
ing consolidation, some portions of the city carried a heavy
tax burden to finance, the extension of utilities to more
thinly settled, newly annexed sections, these expenditures were
(1) Quotdi: Regional Plan of New York: opcit., P. 265
(no source given)
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soon justified by the growth and spread of population.
Furthermore, the marked budget increase during the decade
1898-1908 arose not only from the extension of service
over a greater area, but from its expansion and improvement
in response to a more ambitious concept of government that
was developing during this period.
It is nonetheless true that any governmental reorganiza-
tion is likely to create a demand by the annexed areas for a
level of service comparable to that enjoyed by the older and
more developed areas. Where population increase is rapid,
as in New York around the turn of the century, the enlarged
city can afford to extend utilities to thinly settled areas
in the certain knowledge that growth will soon bring a suf-
ficient number of new taxpayers to support the facilities.
Today, with the prospect of future growth much less certain,
cities are not justified in freezing their insufficient
funds in projects that may not become productive of any but
minute tax revenue until some time in a remote and conjec-
tural future. However, if the tax rate is uniform throughout
a governmental area, taxpayers in relatively undeveloped areas
can, with reason, demand the same services as received by
urban property owners.
Any metropolitan government must face this dilemma;
in the past certain cities have countered the suburban oppo-
Bition to consolidation by a tax differential which warrants
an equivalent of differentials in service. Baltimore first
employed this device as early as 1797 and in 1816 estab-
lished by ordinance the principle that annexed territory
should be exempted from the full rate till it reached a
specified density; Philadelphia, having first provided
for a differential in connection with the 1854 consolidation,
established three standard tax rates by an 1868 ordinance:
agricultural and suburban property were taxed respectively
at one-half and two-thirds of the full rate prevailing for
urban properties. During this period differentials were
also introduced in St. Louis and Pittsburg and in some
localities have continued in use up to the present time,
Although admittedly useful in overcoming suburban
opposition, differentials provide such opportunity for in-
justice that their use is undesirable; while initially they
represent mere recognition of the small quantity of govern-
mental service which can economically be offered newly an-
nexed areas, this justification soon disappears as the city
extends roads, mains and other fadlities into the suburbs.
The differential, unfortunately, usually does not disappear,
but lingers on to present owners in the area with an undeserved
subsidy, and to create abundant opportunity for tax evasion:
in Pittsburg, for instance, a 1910 survey showed that property
(l) Studenski: om.cit., P. 156 ff.
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owners were able to secure the reduced "rural" rates
merely by adorning developed city properties with a few
judiciously located flower beds.
A scheme of "utility service" sub-areas within the
territory of the federated metropolitan government escapes
the danger of freezing by ordinance tax differentials which
may die hard despite the subseqpent disappearance of their
justification, but at the same time avoids the uniform tax
rate that obligates the government to provide uniform ser-
vice throughout its area. Although it is suggested in a
later paragraph that such utility functions as the metro-
politan government undertakes be financed in part by service
charges, the remaining revenue, if raised by real property
taxation, should be levied on the functional sub-areas
receiving the service rather than on the entire metropoli-
tan territory. Although such a scheme admittedly complicates
the tax structure, it is the only feasible method of recog-
nising the differing needs of the metropolitan district's
areas and of avoiding the prohibitive expense of extending
utility services throughout its entire area.
Under such a scheme there would emerge perhaps 5 ffi nc-
tional sub-areas for the administration of those functions,-
including arterial roads, water supply, sewerage systems,
ports and airfields, in which a substantial degree of
(1) Studenski: op.cit., P. 163.
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metropolitan control is desirable; since these areas would
neither comprise the entire metropolitan district nor neces-
sarily coincide with one another, the total metropolitan tax
rate, designed to support these and other metropolitan
functions, would vary in accordance with the number of sub-
areas in which a property was included. Since for the
reasons previously mentioned the social and preventive
functions assumed by the metropolitan government should ex-
tend over its entire area they should also be supported by
the taxation of its entire area. On the other hand, since
they can reasonably be confined to sub-areas, the utility
functions present the basis for what is in effect a tax
differential.
The opportunity offered by the utility functions to
relieve the burden on the property tax by developing reve-
nue from service charges should not be neglected. Since
the benefits arising from these/services can be traced with
reasonable accuracy, if not always by a meter, inferentially
as by ownership of a car, service charges based on use
should be used to raise approximately 50% of the revenue
needed to support the utility functions. Complete financing
on this basis is unwise, however, since it ignores, first,
the relative financial ability to pay of.i the individual
and, secondly, the value increment given a property by the
mere accessibility of a utility even though it may not
actually be used.
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Paitial financing through service charges has an
additional advantage which becomes apparent when consider-
ation is given to some of the possible economic effects of
governmental reorganization. Table 23 presents figures
indicating the alterations in the 1940 tax rates which would
result from pooling the actual assessed valuations and the
actual tax levies of the 30 cities and towns and then financ-
ing the sum of the levies by a metropolitan rate; this is
simply to say that the same overall total is to be raised,
but strictly in accordance with ability to pay as indicated
by assessed valuations in the different municipalities.
The most radical effects of a metropolitan levy are that
Revere's rate is reduced 15% while Wellesley's is increased
70%, and the rates in the other cities and towns show inter-
mediate adjustments. Since in theory property values are
adjusted by the amount of the capitalized tax rate, it fol-
lows that such changes in rates would reduce every $1,000
of property by over $300 dollars in Wellesley while adding
about $130 to the value of each $1000 worth of property in
1
Revere. Any change which withdraws nearly one-third of a
property's value approaches confiscation and would be vigor-
ously and justifiably opposed, even though value is not de-
stroyed, but merely shifted to other parts of the area.
(1) Capitalizing at 5%; these figures are subject to
qualifications too numerous to discuss at this point.
TABLE 22
HYPOTHETICAL EFFECT OF TAX RATE EQUALIZATION : 1940
30 CITIES AND TOWNS
Arlington
Belmont
Boston
Braintree
Brookline
Cambridge
Chelsea
Dedham
Everett
Lexington
Lynn
Malden
Medford
Melrose
Milton
Needham
Newton
Quincy
Revere
Saugus
Somerville
Stoneham
Wakefield
Waltham
Watertown
Wellesley
Weymouth
Winchester
Winthrop
Woburn
TOTAL
Assessed
Valuations
1940
(add 000)
59,275
52,177
19483,235
25,325
153,272
170,604
44,475
24,736
72,949
21,829
130,822
68,724
78,378
38,525
40,048
25,273
167,587
121,356
40,092
.15,877
114,058
14,132
20,758
50,163
51,345
43,632
49,186
32,728
24,858
20,407
3,255,826
Tax Rate
1940
$35.80
29.20
40.60
34.00
24.50
43.00
45.40
35.20
37.40
32.20
35.40
41,40
41.60
33060
26.40
27.80
29.20
32.20
44.00
42030
42.30
37.20
34,40
36.40
35.00
21.90
24.00
27.20
29.40
35.40
Direct Tax
1940
(add 000)
2,120
1,520
60,200
8,600
3,760
7,330
2,020
870
2,920
704
4,620
2,840
3,260
1,290
1,060
703
4,890
3,920
1,760
671
4,830
525
713
1,830
1,800
955
1,180
890
731
722
121,294
Adjustment In Tax Rate
Increase Decrease
1.50
8.00
3.30
12.80
2010
5.10
1.90
3.70
10.90
10*50
8.10
5,00
0,10
2.90
0.90
2.30
15.40
13.30
10.10
7090
1.90
3.30
5.70
8010
0.10
4.10
4.30
6.70
5.00
500
DT/AV : "Metropolitan" Tax Rate Of $37.30
Source: See Appendix B
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Since, as suggested below, the metropolitan government
might forego the real property tax in favor of other reve-
nues and, in any case, would absorb functions slowly over a
considerable period of time, its creation would not have
the drastic effect on property values and on tax rates aris-
ing in the hypothetical situation outlined above. However,
if it bases any of its revenue on real property, the long
term.effect of metropolitan government will be- first to
equalize financial effort, by drawlng propofrtionately more
of its property tax revenue from the wealthier municipali-
ties, and secondly, to alter property values as a consequence.
Any income that is derived from charges, which are not com-
monly capitalized in determining property values, will reduce
the total that must be raised by the property tax and will
thus have the desirable result of diminishing the amplitude
of property value readjustments. In the case of roads, the
necessary charges might take the form of an excise, admin-
istered by the metropolitan government, on passenger vehicles
and trucks, while the subordinate units' proportional share
of the cost of metropolitan water and sewerage projects might
be met by locally administered fees charged the users of the
municipal sewerage and water systems.
However, though they furnish a partial safeguard against
heavy new property taxes with their unsettling affect on values
and, even where the latter tax is not used, constitute a
useful additional revenue source, charges for services
cannot be expected to meet the entire cost of metropolitan
government; perhaps 80O of its revenue must be raised by
other devices. A graded wage tax, bearing more heavily on
the higher salary levels, avoids the radical disturbance of
property values arising from substantial readjustment in the
real property tax rate and in an area as large as the metro-
politan district has the additional advantage of easy admin-
istration. If the Philadelphia experience can be considered
representative, a metropolitan district of approximately 2
million residents should find no difficulty in raising 25 or
30 million dollars annually through such a wage tax, which,
when supplemented by charges for services and grants from
the state and federal government, should make attainable an
annual metropolitan government revenue of 40 million dollars.
As a rough indication of the amount of governmental activity
it might support, this sum can be compared with Boston's 1940
1
revenue receipts of about 83 million dollars or with 1946
total Metropolitan District Commist on assessments of some-
2
what over 5 million dollars.
Although it might ultimately be expected to return an
equal yield, a metropolitan real property tax raises certain
(1 See PD 79.
(2 See PD 92.
obstacles. Since so few homes are owner occupied in many
of our large cities - in Boston the figure is only 20%,-
a property tax should preferably be rather on an occupancy
than an ad valorem basis. If rental levels were readjusted
to reflect the changed incidence, an occupancy tax would
merely convert to a direct burden the indirect contribution
to government's cost which is now included in the landlord's
bill and would separate two payments now made as one: the
check to the landlord would represent payment for shelter
and the check to the metropolitan government would represent
payment for municipal service. It is possible that such a
tax by greatly increasing the number of citizens making a
direct financial contribution to local government would have
the happy effect of stimulating citizen interest and partici-
pation in its processes. However, the obstacles to the im-
position of a metropolitan occupancy tax are formidable;
since it still bears on property, the occupancy tax would
necessitate a corresponding reduction in the ad valorem levies
that might still be used by the local units; rent reductions
would also be required to prevent bleeding the tenant to the
profit of the landlord. As it is most unlikely that anything
short of legislative fiat would accomplish either of these
complicated readjustments, it is apparent that the graded wage
tax might well be a more practical revenue measure for the
metropolitan district.
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Of the metropolitan district's postulated annual
revenue of around 40 million dollars, 5 or more million
might derive from grants made by the federal and state
governments. In view of the 17% of annual revenue which
cities of over 25,000 are now securing from this source and
in the light of the trend toward greater centralization
which has been developing, this estimate may well be con-
servative. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the
lack of correspondence between effective taxing and effec-
tive administrative areas compels a compromise with the older
governmental theory that responsible and effective govern-
ment is obtained only by preserving the strictest coordina-
tion between payments made and services received. "Clearly,
it is illogical to say that a necessary social service
should not be provided because the subordinate units - which,
from the standpoint of effectiveness and popular control
should administer it - cannot themselves raise revenues ade-
quate to finance the service. Nor is it logical to insist
that a central government, which can raise the necessary
revenues, should necessarily administer the service merely
because it has the fiscal capacity to finance it." Although
its larger size will make it a more adequate taxing area than
are the numerous political units which now divide the area,
the metropolitan government will still lack the revenue
(1) Hansen and Perloff: State and Local Finance in the
National Economy, P. 31.
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raising ability of the higher governmental levels and will
still need the financial assistance which the federal and
state governments are in a position to extend.
6
The principles that have been outlined as guides for the
organization of metropolitan government obviously relegate
the formerly independent municipalities to the minor rle of
subordinate administrative agents of the central government.
These units will retain absolute control over certain secon-
dary functions, for example local recreation facilities and
street cleaning, and will also provide the local administration
of many of the primary functions which will come under the
guiding authority of the central government; in addition, the
local units will be free to supplement the services or stan-
dards which the former provides, and thus might in some cases
support through local taxation certain educational facilities
not required by the minimum standards enforced by the central
government throughout the entire metropolitan area. Yet the
essential fact remains that when the fully established metro-
politan government has undertaken functions, not only in the
utility, but also in the "social" and preventive fields, ulti-
mate control and determination of policy will rest not with the
local units but with the central government. Routine health
services, as an example, will be administered by the local
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unit s, which will hire their own personnel and f ormulate
their own programs - but under the guidance and even the
orders of the central government, which, in addition, will
itself provide certain specialized services. The gains in
better planning, more uniform performance, greater effi-
ciency, simplified governmental structure and a host of
other fields is clear. Yet the question remains: Is the
disappearance of the smaller unitet independence too great
a price to pay?
Earlier discussion will, perhaps, have indicated that
the price is at most only nominal, since the overlapping
duplication and disorganization of government within the
metropolitan district so stifles local units that their po-
tentialities are lost. A governmental unit ideally provides
opportunities for citizen participation and a responsiveness
to local desires and conditions which are cheaply bought even
at the sacrifice of material efficiency and a few cents in
the tax rate, for it is this intimate relationship between
government and citizen that helps shape the common purposes,
shared endeavors and mutual responsibility which are a
vital government's most precious contribution to society.
As we have seen, however, the governmental disorganization
of the metropolitan district thwarts not only efficiency
but also clouds the relations that should prevail between
the citizen and his government. Reorganization of government
in metropolitan districts is in no sense an attack upon the
principles of local government but merely an attempt to
make them operative within the metropolitan district and to
encourage citizen participation and control by sweeping
away the governmental debris that today obscures any ready
appreciation of the organization and the problems of gov-
ernment.
Despite the social and economic changes which subtly
undermine their validity, old ideas, however, linger on to
warp our thinking and to give the metropolitan district's
existing governmental confusion a longer lease on life than
it deserves. For example, despite the transformations
brought by an intervening century and a half, the Jeffer-
sonian belief is still strong that the best government is
least government; and equally tenacious is the attitude to
which Jackson gave classic expression in his Etatement that
"The duties of all public offices are, or at least admit of
being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence
may readily qualify themselves for their performance."
Although perhaps a logical response to the governmental
demands created by a sparsely settled and rapidly expanding
country, these believes are today outdated, for despite
(1) Quoted White: Introduction to The Study of Public Admin-
istration, P. 280, from Richardson, James D. (ed.)
A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presi-
dents, (1908), Vol. II, pp. 448-49.
protests government continues to assume new functions
requiring for their execution not merely general compe-
tence and goodwill, but specific skills and techniques.
A fundamental governmental reorganization is only a
recognition of changed conditions and an effort to achieve
both the efficiency of service and the responsiveness to
citizen control which enables government to reach its
full potentialities as a social institution.
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APPENDIX A
List of Abbreviations
Titles
the text or
AC
AER
AJS
Annals
APCA
APSR
MLR
NMR
NTAB
PAR
of periodicals to which reference is made in
in the bibliography are abbreviated as follows:
- American City
- American Economic Review
- American Journal of Sociology
- Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science
- American Planning and Civic Annual
- American Political Science Review
- Minnesota Law Review
- National Municipal Review
- National Tax Association Bulletin
- Public Administration Review
Reference to Massachusetts Public Documents, which are
the source of most of the figures given in the text and
tables, is made in accordance with the abbreviations listed
below. In all cases these documents are annual reports;
however, since their printing was suspended during the war,
they are in general available only through 1941.
PD 1 - Mass: Office of the Secretary: Annual Report on
the Vital Statistics of Massachusetts
PD 2 - Mass: Dept. of Public Education: Annual Report
(2 parts)
PD 16 - Mass: Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation:
Annual Report
PD 19 - Mass: Dept. of Corporations and Taxation: A-
gregates of Polls, Property and Taxes
PD 34 - Mass: Dept. of Public Health: Annual Report
PD 48 - Mass: Metropolitan District Commission:
Annual Report
PD 79 - Mass: Dept. of Corporations and Taxation:
Statistics of Munipal Finance
PD 92 - Mass: Treasury Dept.: Assessments ... of the
Metropolitan District Commission
BRMG is used in the text and in the bibliography as an
abbreviation for Bureau for Research in Municipal Govern-
ment, Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard
University. In addition, titles of certain frequently
cited publications of the Bureau are abbreviated as follows:
BRMG 5 - Lambie, Morris B.: Experiments in Methods
of Municipal Analysis, The Bureau, Cam-
bridge, 1941. (Publication #5)
BRMG 12 - Bureau for Research in Municipal Government:
Comparative Status of 83 Cities and
Towns in The Boston Metropolitan Census
District 1~4 The Bureau, Cambridge, 1944.
(Publication #12)
BRIG 13 - Hinckley, Thomas L.: Legislation Affecting
Municipal Finance in Massachusetts -
1906-1945, The Bureau, Cambridge, 1946.
(Publication #13)
BRMG 16 - Bureau for Research in Municipal Government:
Comparative Status of 43 Cities and Towns
in The Boston Metropolitan Commission Dis-
tricts, The Bureau, Cambridge, 1947.
(Publication #16)
BRMG 17 - Abraham, Hans F. and Greeley Priscilla M.:
Federal and State Grants-in-Aid: Annotated
Laws, The Bureau Cambridge, 1947.
(Publication #175
APPENDIX B
Source and Explanation of Statistics
for .the Boston Inner Metropolitan District
Prefatory Note: Since institutional population is
included in the U. S. Census, per capita figures computed
for Belmont, Boston, Lexington and Waltham on the basis af
16th Census population totals would be distorted by the
considerable number of inmates of Federal and State institu-
tions located in these localities. To avoid this difficulty,
the estimated number of such inmates has been subtracted from
the Census population to yield new population figures which,
unless otherwise specifically noted, have been used in com-
puting all per capita figures for these four municipalities.
The Census and the revised figures are listed below: (See
BRMG 12, p. 35):
1940 Population
1940 U.S. Census excluding Institutional
Population Population
Belmont 26,867 26 667
Boston 770,816 766,739
Lexington 13,187 11,212
Waltham 40,020 38,602
Per capitas for the other cities and towns are derived,
using data given in the 16th U.S. Census (1940). It should
be noted that accuracy is limited by the fact that a slide
rule has been used in the computations.
Per capita expenditure figures are in all cases derived
from the maintenance or operating costs of the department or
function under consideration; such costs comprise the major
part of a municipality's annual disubrsements and furnish
the most reliable basis for comparative analysis. Although
capital outlays are thus excluded, their effect is eventu-
ally reflected in maintenance costs as increased plant swells
the expenditures for upkeep, operation, repairs, etc.
Table 10: Area, Population and Density: 1940
(30 Cities and Towns)
Source: BRMG 16, Pp. 2, 4, and 19
Notes: Area is 1940 land area in square miles. The
population figures for Belmont, Boston,
Lexington and Waltham represent U. S. Census
totals; the number of inmates of Federal
and State institutions lying within these
municipalities has not been deducted.
Table 11: Indices of Comparative Wealth: 1940
(30 Cities and Towns)
Source: Col. 1: Computed using BRMG 12, Table 16.
Cols. 2 and 3: Bureau of Business Research,
Boston University College of Business Ad-
ministration: New England Community
Statistical Abstracts (3rd ed.) 1942;
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Cols. 4, 5, and 6: 16th Census (1940):
Housing, Vol. II, General Characteristics
Part 3, Tables 22 and 24.
Notes: Assessed valuation is the value of real and
personal property on the municipal tax
rolls. "Highly paid workers" include all
those falling in the three U. 8. Census
categories of "professional", "semi-
professional" and "proprietor and manager."
It should be noted that while Col. 1 gives
average 1940-1941 figures the remaining
columns present figures for 1940 alone.
Table 12: Average Direct Tax Per Capita, Tax Rate
and Assessed Valuation Per Capita: 1940-
1941 (30 Cities and Towns)
Source: Computed from figures in BRNG 12, Table 16.
Table 13:
Source:
Notes:
Average Expenditure for Road Maintenance:
1940-1941 (30 Cities and Towns)
Col. 1: Computed from PD 79; Col. 2:
Mass. Dept. of Public Works data on file
at BRMG.
Mileage figures include all roads classified
as urban, urban through, or rural, but
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Table 14:
Source:
Table 15:
Source:
exclude all categories of private, State
and Metropolitan District roads. Expen-
ditures also are limited to payments made
by the municipality (including, however,
the small number financed by Ch. 90 assis-
tance) and exclude State or M.D.C. expen-
ditures within the municipality. The
municipal expenditures include disburse-
ments for: general highway department
administration, general highway expenditure,
sidewalks and curbing, snow and ice removal,
sprinkling, lighting, and "other expenses",
Average Expenditure for Street Cleaning:
1940-1941 (14 Cities)
Computed from PD 79, using mileage figures.
given in Table 13.
Recreational Maintenance Expenditures and
Facilities: 1940 (25 Cities and Towns)
National Recreation Association: Municipal
and County Parks in the United States
(ed. Butler, George D.) The Association,
New York, no date. Table B. Data is not
given for Dedham, Medford, Needham, Saugus,
and Winthrop, which are accordingly not
listed in Table 15.
Notes: Parks are considered to include
all types of municipally supported
open area, including playgrounds,
playfields, neighborhood parks, res-
ervations, etc., and even parkways
and public building sites when land-
scaped. Acreage is combined land
and water area. Maintenance expen-
ditures include those from regular
municipal funds for operation and
maintenance of parks; capital out-
lays and expenditures from gifts
and emergency funds (e.g. Federal
work relief projects) are excluded.
The payments made by the various
municipalities to the Metropolitan
Parks District are also apparently
omitted.
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Table 16: Average Operating Expenditures of Fire
Departments, Average Number of Fires
and Average Loss: 1940-1941 (17 Cities
and Towns)
Source: Cols. 1 and 2: Operating expenditures: PD 79,
assessed valuation of buildings: PD 19,
Part 1, Table 2; Col. 3: International City
Managers' Association: The Municipal Year-
book 1941, Tables XVI-A, XVI-B; The Muni-
,cipal Yearbook 19Hz, Tables XIII-A, XIII-B.
Cola. 4 and 5: "Fire Record for Cities" in
The Quarterly of the National Fire Protec-
tion Association, 34: 332 ff., Apr. 1941
and 35:347 ff. Apr. 1942
Notes: The data given in columns 5 and 8 are available
only for municipalities having over 25,000
population in 1940; the smaller cities and
towns of the Inner Metropolitan District
have thus of necessity been omitted from
this tabulation. Since PD 19 has not been
published for 1941, the figures given in the
1940 volume have been used in lieu of the
1941-1941 average assessed valuation of
buildings. Fire department employees are
defined to include all full-time paid
firemen,' officers and civilian employees, but
to exclude volunteers, call men and
"sleepers". Building fires include both
roof and chimney fires.
Table 1?: Average Operating Expenditures of Police
Departments and Average Crime Rates:
1940-1941 (28 Cities and Towns)
Source: Col. 1: Computed from PD 79; Col. 2: Inter-
national City Managers' Association:
Municipal Yearbook 1941, Tables XVII-A
and XVII-B; Municipal Yearbook 19_2,
Tables XIV-A and XIV-B. Cols. 3, 4, 5
and 6: For municipalities of 25,000 and
over: U. 8. Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Uniform Crime Reports, 4th Quarterly Bulletin
(Vol. XI, No.4, 1940 and Vol. XII, No. 4,
1941.) For municipalities under 25,000: FBI
data on file at BRIG.
Notes: Data for municipalities under 25,000 population
is not for publication and should be regarded
as confidential. Number of police department
employees used in deriving police-population
ratios includes all full-time paid policemen,
officers and civilians. Burglary includes
breaking or entering. The larceny rates are
based only on those offenses where theft
exceeded $50 in value. Of the 7 so-called
Part I offenses (i.e. those crimes in which
all or virtually all offenses are known to
the police) rates are given for 4; homicide,
rape and murder, the other 3 Part I offenses,
are- of such rare occurrence that rates, es-
pecially for small localities, are totally
unreliable unless averaged over a 5-year
period. Data is not available for Everett
and Weymouth which are accordingly -omitted
from Table 17.
Table 18: Average Expenditures for General Relief and
Average Case Loads: 1940-1941. (30 Cities
and Towns)
Source: BRPG Files.
Notes: Expenditures include direct and indirect dis-
bursements, i.e. payments for service, for
instance medical care, as well as direct
financial aid, but exclude the administra-
tive and overhead costs of running the program.
Per case expenditure is computed by dividing
direct and indirect expenditures by the
average monthly case load multiplied by 12.
Expenditures per case will, of course, be
affected not only by the annual number of
oases but by the average number of indivi-
duals involved in each case. The municipali-
ties receive virtually no state aid in the
financing of general relief.
Table 19: Average Expenditures for Aid to Dependent
Children and Average Case Loads: 1940-1941
(30 Cities and Towns)
Source: BRMG Files.
Notes: Expenditure figures include both direct and
indirect disbursements, but exclude adminis-
trative expenses. Per case expenditure com-
puted as explained in Notes for Table 18.
42 U.S. Code (1943) 501 defines a dependent
child in part as follows: "a needy child
who has been deprived of parental support
or care by reason of the death, continual
absence from home, or physical or mental
incapacity of a parent .... " Expenses
of program are borne approximately as fol-
lows: Federalt 25%; Massachusetts: 33%;
Municipality: 42%.
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Table 20: Average Expenditures for Health Services and
Selected Average Vital Statistics: 1940-1941.
(30 Cities and Towns).
Source: Col. 1: PD 79; Cols. 2 and 3: PD 1, Table 27;
Cols. 4 and 5: PD 2, Table - "Causes of
Deaths from Diseases Dangerous to Public
Health."
Notes: Total death rates allocate deaths to place of
residence; rates as given in PD 1 and as
presented here are based on 16th Census
populations for 1940 and on an estimated
population for 1941. The populations of
Boston, Belmont, Lexington, Waltham are not
reduced by the number of inmates of Federal
and State institutions located in these mu-
nicipalities, but deaths occurring in the
institutions are allocated to former place
of residence. Infant death rates:- deaths,
excluding stillbirths--of children under
1 year of age per 1,000 live births. Figures
are allocated and in published form are avail-
able only for municipalities of 15,000 or
over. Col. 4 shows ratio of new tuberculosis
cases reported to annual tuberculosis deaths;
Col. 5 shows number of new venereal disease
cases reported annually per 100,000 popu-
lation. In both cases, high ratios are
believed to indicate effective disease dis-
covery work. See American Public Health
Association: Appraisal Form, 1934, which sug-
gests respective standards of 2 and 600.
Table 21: Average Operating Expenditures, Average Enroll-
ment Ratios and Average Per Pupil Valuations
for Public Schools: 1940-1941. (30 Cities
and Towns)
Source: PD 2, Part II.
Notes: Figures are for the school years beginning
Oct. 1, 1940 and 1941, except that expendi-
tures are for fiscal years ending Dec. 31,
1940 and 1941. Expenditures include funds
from all sources, includini local taxation,
state reimbursement, receipts for tuition
and transportation, etc. All pupil ratios
are based on net average membership which,
by statute, is defined as average member-
ship plus the pupils for whom the munici-
pality paid tuition for over half the school
year less non-resident pupils attending the
municipality's schools for over half the
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Table 29:
Source:
Notes:
school year. Value of school property per
pupil is based only on 1941 enrollments and
plant values and not on averaged figures.
Hypothetical Effect of Tax Rate Equalization:
1940. (30 Cities and Towns)
Col. 1: BRMG Files; Col. 2: BRMG 12, Table 16.
Cols. 3, 4, and 5: Computed.
The 30 1940 direct tax levies, computed by
multiplying the 1940 tax rate of each mu-
nicipality by its assessed valuation, were
added to obtain the total levy for the
entire district; this figure was divided
by the district's total assessed valuation
to secure a hypothetical "district tax rate"
of $37,30,
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